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We do not have to wait for the great, visibly cracking structures
of our society to collapse eventually. Every single one has already
gone-government, law, politics, society itself, the family, the
Church, education. What of these appears still to stand is illusion,
a mechanical automaton whirring on a dead momentum.
-Elizabeth Sewell1
I. The Winter of Discontent
The student revolts that have rocked campuses across the country
have left the law schools relatively untouched. This is a social plie-
nomenon that is not difficult to understand. Law and revolution have
never made very congenial bedfellows. The observations made by De
Tocqueville about the nature of the legal spirit in America are as
valid today as they were when he wrote:
Men who have more especially devoted themselves to legal pur-
suits derive from these occupations certain habits of order, a taste
for formalties, and a kind of instinctive regard for the regular
connection of ideas, which naturally render them very hostile
to the revolutionary spirit.2
In a more recent commentary upon the psychodynamics of legal
education, Andrew Watson has identified among law students a
greater than average need for order and security, a factor which plays
a critical role in their functioning both in the academic milieu and
later in their professional lives 8
What is surprising, and for me, uplifting is the dramatic, if belated,
appearance of a small but articulate minority of law students who have
begun to express a profound dissatisfaction with legal education that
may be more pervasive than any of us have imagined.4 That is not to
t" Acting Professor of Law, University of California at Davis. B.A. 1060, LL.B. 1903,
Columbia University.
1. Sewell, First Reports from an Experimental College, 4 J. ol: BtAvIoRAL SNtNaOE
351 (1968).
2. A. DE TocquEvtLLE, DEmoCiAy IN AMERCA 171 (H. Commager ed. 1947).
3. Watson, The Quest for Professional Competence: Psychological Aspects of Legal
Education, 37 U. CINN. L. Rtv. 93, 101 (1968).
4. For example, in her valedictory address at the Hastings Law School Commencenent
in June 1969, Jennie Rhine raised more than a few eyebrows when she wondered aloud
if these "last three years [had] not been, to a large extent, a waste of my time." Vor tile
most part, she said, her legal education had not been "a challenging or rewarding ex-
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say that administrators or law professors have been unaware of certain
deficiencies of contemporary legal education or have failed to under-
take measures to remedy them. But the climate of educational reform
has had about it that smug satisfaction and bland assurance that pro-
ceeds from the assumption that those who teach know what is best
for those who learn. Of course, there are student representatives on
many of our committees, but nobody really expects them to tell us
what to teach or how to teach it, and even if they try, we outnumber
them, so we can either bludgeon them into submission or simply out-
vote them. And while we give students representation on the Curric-
ulum Committee and the Faculty-Student Relations Committee, we
exclude them from participation in making decisions about faculty
recruitment, tenure, promotion and the budget. And the sadness of it
all is that they are so eternally grateful to us for our magnanimous
tokenism. As one teacher has expressed it, some students "recognize
their put-on for what it is and even let their rebellion break through
to the surface now and then," but others have been more deeply brain-
perience," and she made it clear that she was "not alone in feeling this way," that
"almost all of us come to regard law school only as an ordeal--something to be survived
so that one can get on to more important things." Peter Westen, in an interview in
1968, when he was editor-in-chief of the Law Review of the University of California at
Berkeley, described how he had come to law school with an image of the lawyer as a
social engineer only to find that, in the second and third years, "the school taught us
... to think less of social horizons than of bread and butter." Westen Tells it Lihe It I!,
The Writ, April 1, 1968, at I. At the University of California at Davis, several news-
letters circulated by a small group of activist law students who ironically called them-
selves "The Silent Majority" criticized their legal education as "devoid of dimension"
and "wholly inadequate in the face of today's ever-pressing problems," urging students
to "assume the responsibility placed on us by our times." In an editorial in the Colum-
bia Law School News, a student wrote: "The other day in a class, the professor noted in
passing that the purpose of law school is not to teach the myriad intricades of the law,
but rather to give the students a very broad outlook on law and related social problems.
By his own standards, Columbia Law School fails dismally." Fitch, Bitching, Columbia
Law School News, Jan. 13, 1969, at 5. In an effort to reform the curriculum, te Black
Law Students Union at Yale has proposed new courses designed to treat problems rel.
evant to black lawyers and their clients, including a seminar on "Black Business," a
course in "Economic Strategies for the Black Community," and a program in "The
American Tax System" which "would examine how the present Federal tax structure has
permitted the entrenchment of the wealthiest classes and the corporations, while exacting
a disproportionate share of tax revenue from poorer people, and from the middle clam"
BLSU Course Proposals for Yale Law School, BLAmc LAW STUruDE.%s UNIo.v JouaLm.,
1968-69, at 3. A law student at the University of Wisconsin, after a series of in.depth
interviews with first year law students, tentatively concluded that the "century old method
of legal instruction . . . causes unnecessary stress and underachievement . . . (and] that
testing procedures already employed deprive the profession of creative, energetic, and
valuable personalities." Silver, Anxiety and the First Semester of Law School, 1963 Us.
L. Rv. 1201, 1218. At Harvard Law School, a memorandum that reflected the views of
150 first-year students expressed the conviction that the grading system "draws critical
distinctions among students prematurely, at the expense of developing talents over a
three-year period . . . [and] is a detrimental force in the lives of man)' first-year stu-
dents .... " Members of the Class of 1971, The Trouble With Grades, 1969, at 1 (un-
published document on file in Yale Law Library).
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washed and can't see "what all the fuss is about because Mr. Charlie
'treats us real good.' "6r
I recall what it was like being a law student. That incredible bore-
dom of the second and third years drove me from the classroom into
the sanctuary of the Law Review where I sought an intense involve-
ment and an excitement that the rest of the law school did not offer.
The major difference between me then and dissident students today, I
suspect, is that I lacked the cultural maturity or whatever gift it is that
enables them to see things as they really are. I had always been con-
vinced that there might have been something wrong with me and never
dreamed that I had the right to expect something more from professors
whose authority I never dared to challenge.
There is not a single lawyer I know with whom I went to law school
who feels that his legal education adequately prepared him for the
practice of law (or anything else for that matter). My experience in
one of the larger post-graduate educational institutions in America-
the New York District Attorney's Office-was sobering. Trying to re-
construct an incident from interviews with witnesses; awakening to the
ritualistic performance of police officers on the witness stand; plumbing
the subleties of the plea-bargaining process; learning the nuances of
communication between judges and attorneys, I became suddenly
aware of the unforgivable irrelevance of my legal education to what
was happening in my head, in the courtroom and in the streets of our
cities. The first case I tried was a numbing experience. My only conso-
lation was that the Legal Aid lawyer who represented the defendant
was as woefully untutored as I. Together, we waged a relentless battle
of almost metaphysical absurdity: the implacable innocence of Charlie
Brown versus the invincible ignorance of Lucy.,
It would be unfair to suggest that law schools today (or at least
the "better" schools) are unaware of what Dean Manning has called
that "endless agenda of unfinished business" facing the legal profes-
5. J. Farber, The Student as Nigger, 1067, at 2 (mimeographed document on file hi
Yale Law Library). "The saddest cases among both black slaves and student slaves ate
the ones who have so thoroughly introjected their masters' values that their anger is all
turned inward .... [These are the students] for whom every low grade is torture, who
stammer and shake when they speak to a professor, who go throughI an emotional crisis
every time they're called upon during class. You can recognize them easily at finals time.
Their faces are festooned with fresh pimples; their bowels boil audibly across the room.
If there really is a Last Judgment, the parents and teachers who created these wrecks
are going to burn in hell." Id. 3. See also, E. FRIEDENUERO, CoMlING or Aaa IN AtiEIUCA
9-10 (1963).
6. I owe the metaphor to Edgar Friedenberg. Id. 181.
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sion.7 Faculty memoranda, law review articles, building dedication
ceremonies and conferences such as the American Assembly on Law
and the Changing Society held in 1968 and the Symposium on Issues
in Legal Education sponsored last year by the Conference of West-
ern Law Schools attest to an ongoing concern about the directions
in which we are moving in legal education. But the genius of our
educational institutions-to adapt an observation of a former president
of the American Bar Association-is to make accommodations to shift-
ing objectives "without profound or radical changes in fundamentals."8
There may be wisdom in a strategy of gradualism, but we ought at
least to stop deceiving ourselves about the limits of our tolerance for
experimentation. If we want to make only those changes that are certi-
fied as wise by those members of the faculty who are "marked by
maturity and experience,"9 we ought at least to end our colluding
with each other in the delusion that we are engaged in real innovation.
Making change on the basis of "informed" and "mature" opinion, as
William Arrowsmith has said, will almost inevitably have the effect of
stifling reform, if only because informed and mature opinion is "un-
adventurous and tyrannous as well as profoundly snobbish."'" And,
finally, let us stop conning students into believing that they have some-
thing to say about their legal education. Students (and young pro-
fessors, I might add) resent members of the faculty who invite them
to say what they want but refuse to take them or their ideas seriously.
Unless we begin to understand that, our efforts to establish an authentic
dialogue with students or among ourselves will never move beyond the
pious incantation of academic bullshit.
For myself, the only way to grow is to take risks and experiment.
Good schools, like happy marriages, are not made in heaven or plotted
at monthly meetings. Effective learning cannot be summoned or com-
manded. It is the felicitous but quite fortuitous result of encounters
of teachers with students, of students with students, of teachers with
teachers, on issues that teachers are really interested in and students
give a damn about. "Within pretty wide limits of utter triviality,"
Paul Goodman has suggested wisely, "there can be good education that
7. Manning, Introduction: New Tasks for Lawyers, in LAW IN A CQiNcL;c AMERICA
1 (G. Hazard ed. 1968).
8. Gossett, Balances and Controls in Private Policy and Decision.Making, i id. 266.
9. Manning, supra note 7, at 1.
10. Arrowsmith, The Future of Teaching, in CQarus 1980, at 124 (A. Eurich ed. 1968).
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is 'general' or 'specialist,' 'liberal' or 'useful,' ... ['emphirical' or 'the.
oreticalF."Z'
If any real learning is to go on in our schools (and I take it that is
what we are all concerned about), then our first responsibility must be
to the human beings who live in our academic house, not to the Bar,
or the profession, or the alumni. That means that much of our ac-
ademic planning must involve not the shaping of something called the
"curriculum" but the removal of blocks and resistances within the
educational organism so that students are free to achieve their own
levels of integration. As long as we continue to see legal education as
the acquisition of marketable skills, it will never cease to be anything
more than a dreary task for a future payoff.
II. The Sources and Significance of Student Discontent
A number of assumptions about the "generation gap" and the new
student revolts are circulating as counterfeit currency in formal and
informal exchanges among faculty and ought to be dispelled if we are
to understand the significance of student unrest. One of them portrays
dissent as "maladjustment" or "acting out." It is said that student
activists are rebelling against parental values and just want to give
poor old dad a good kick in the pants by flaunting the authority of the
University. However, most reliable studies suggest that student activ-
ists are not rebelling against their parents. On the contrary, they "seem
to be acting in conformity with their parents' [intellectual and hu-
manitarian] values," but are seeking to implement them in "a purer,
less compromising, and more energetic way."12 Student activists today,
then, may be acting out the collective dream of liberal parents who,
as Jerome Skolnick has pointed out, have adopted a style of "private
attack and public prudence, of private animosity and public accep-
tance"--a life style that might well warrant the charge of hypocrisy.1 3
America's education, like its politics, has denied our most secret long-
ings, and as Peter Marin has suggested, they have come round to haunt
us in the person of our students who "gather, with their simplistic
11. P. GOODMAN, COMPULSORY MIS-EDUCATION AND ThtE CoMMuNrry OF SctoLtAns 814(1964).
12. J. Katz, The Student Activists: Rights, Needs and Powers of Undergraduates
(1967), quoted in Sanford, The College Student of 1980, in CAiPus 1980, at 185i (A. Eurich
ed. 1968). See J. Katz, The Activist Revolution of 1964, in No TME ron Yotrui 886, 899(3. Katz ed. 1968); K. KENNISTON, YOUNG RADicALs: NoTs ON Comtrrm Yount 298
(1968).
18. Skolnick, The Generation Gap, TRmAs-AcnoN, Nov. 1968, at 4.
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moral certainty, at the gates of our universities."' 4 A day of reckoning
is at hand. It may be time to pay our debts to our hearts.
Another popular myth has it that student activists are the "dregs"
of the academic community; that our "best" students are waiting in
the wings for the rebels to finish their little melodrama of discontent so
that they can deliver their orations of praise for the "good job" we are
all doing. The evidence indicates, however, that while the dissident
group is small, its members, "even by conventional standards... [are]
among the more highly achieving [students] in the University."'r8
Among the major findings of the research conducted to date are that
activists score significantly higher in "academic aptitude and perfor-
mance" and that, measured by a variety of personality tests, they emerge
as more realistic and tolerant, less authoritarian, and more intellectually
and aesthetically oriented than their peers. 10 As for many of the
non-activists, test results show them to be more "success-oriented,...
conventional [and] competitive."1 7 One study conducted at Berkeley
describes them as "intellectually disengaged" and "discouragingly in-
different," exhibiting a "passive and even cheerless acceptance of con-
ditions as they are, almost whatever they are."' 8
Another myth of liberal ideology that has been used to explain away
student unrest in the university is the "generation gap"-the idea that
what all the trouble is about is simply a "mutual misunderstanding," a
temporary failure of communication. Edgar Friedenberg has made a
persuasive case for the position that what appears as mere cultural lag
in adults responding to a new social and political maturity in the young
is rather "the expression of what has become genuine class-conflict
between a dominant and exploitative older generation and youth who
are slowly becoming aware of what is happening to them .. . ."13
14. Marn, The Open Truth and Fiery Vehemence of Youth, CEtrm 2%, AZMZ., Feb.
1969, at 64. Laurence Kirschbaum, in a recent book on student unrest, vnrites of all those
parents, teachers and administrators "who are trying in their own perverse wy to make
sense out of what has happened-whether, in fact, youth has gone crazy. Like my
father," he says, "they can read Marcuse, they can recite the arguments, they can deplore
the Vietnam war, or oppose ABM, or support Gene McCarthy. But they won't let them-
selves feel the real hate, because they've poured their best years into raising this gen-
eration and they won't admit that their molds no longer work." IL RArororr & L.
KascrmAu , Is THE LBRARY BuRNmG? 179 (1969).
15. J. Katz, The Activist Revolution of 1961, supra note 12, at 400.
16. Id. 599; J. Katz, The Student Activists: Rights, Needs and Powers of Undergrad-
uates, supra note 12, at 184-85.
17. Id.
18. M. Trow, The Large Campus as a Context for Learning (nino 1963).
19. Friedenberg, The Generation Gap, 382 ANNALS 32, 33 (1969). Once young people
begin to realize what is happening to them and attempt to communicate their percep-
tions to their brothers and sisters, repressive measures are undertaken by the dominant
adult community. See Scoville v. Board of Educ., 286 F. Supp. 988 (N.D. 1Hl. 1969), up-
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The discontented students in our current law school classes are raising
not only a direct challenge to the viability of our educational institu-
tions, but a frontal assault upon certain venerable legal doctrines
nourished by middle-class liberal values. For students who have ex-
perienced the Free Speech Movement at Berkeley, the march on the
Pentagon, the Democratic National Convention in Chicago, the rebel-
lion at Columbia and the confrontation over People's Park in Berkeley
-to say nothing of the countless number of demonstrations, protests
and draft resistance movements that have struck almost every campus
in the country-the refusal of the law to accord the same degree of
constitutional protection to symbolic conduct that it has conferred
upon conventional speech is an insistence that lawful speech be lifeless
speech. Thus, the recent decision of the Supreme Court in the draft-
card 20 cases and its timid opinions in the flag-burning 21 and black arm-
bands22 cases are not merely "unhappy" chapters in the chronicles of a
liberal Court.2 They are powerful satires of the mystifying rhetoric
of political repression. The time-honored liberal distinction between
"speech" and "conduct," as Walter Berns has pointed out, is a legalistic
vehicle for convicting persons for speech that the government regards
as dangerous.24 That old liberal standby of the "man... falsely shout-
holding the expulsion of students who had circulated a literary journal objecting to
school attendance regulations as "utterly idiotic and asinine," noting that "our whole
system of education with all its arbitrary rules and schedules seems dedicated to nothing
but wasting time," and urging students in the future "to either refuse to accept or destroy
upon acceptance all propaganda that .. . [the high school) administration publishes."
Id. at 989. The students were punished for expressing views about public education that
Edgar Friedenberg, Paul Goodman and others have been elaborating for the past ten
years. See, e.g., E. FRIEDENBERG, COMIN, OF AGE IN AMERICA 41-2 (1965); P. GOODMAN,
COMPULSORY MIS-EDUCATION AND THE COMMUNITY oF ScuOLARS 51-63 (1961).
The action of the school administration and the court in Scoiilke confirms rrlcdcii.
berg's observation that the schools help see to it "that the kind of people who get ahead
are the kind who will support the social system it represents, while those who might,
through intent or merely by their being, subvert it, are left behind as a salutary moral
lesson." E. FRIEDENBERO, supra this note, at 49. See also Burnsidc v. Byars, 363 F.2d 744,
748-49 (5 Cir. 1966) ('S]chool rules which assign students to a particular class, forbid
unnecessary discussion in the classroom and prohibit the exchange of conversation be.
tween students are reasonable .. .. Obedience to duly constituted authority ... must be
instilled in our young people.').
20. United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367 (1968).
21. Street v. New York, 394 U.S. 576 (1969).
22. Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School District, 393 U.S. 503
(1969). Within the space of ten pages, the Court emphasized no les than thirteen sep-
arate times that there was no evidence of "aggressive" or "violent" or "disruptive" con-
duct or anything else that would result in "interference with school work or discipline"
or create "disturbances or disorders on the school premises" or "intrude in the school
affairs of the lives of others" or otherwise cause any member of the school community
the slightest distress or deprive him of a moment's sleep. 393 U.S. at 505-14.
23. Cf. Alfange, Free Speech and Symbolic Conduct: The Draft-Card Burning Case,
1968 SUPREME COURT REVIEW 1.
24. W. BERNS, FaRo, VmRTU AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT 56 (1965).
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ing fire in a theatre and causing a panic"-28 is rushed in every time
there is a hint that the speaker is about to move his body or yours. Of
course, Holmes never said anything about shouting fire and mobilizing
action when the house is burning down.
In a recent article on the rebellion at Columbia, Eric Bentley has
eschewed the niceties of legalistic reasoning in reminding us that it is
important to keep radical ideas out of the realm of action "not only
because one is against them but also because one knows they are vi-
tiated by being reduced to a purely verbal existence."20 But, more to
the point, there seems to be within the heart of the liberal temper-
ament an implacable hostility toward the mode of expression rather
than the content of radical protest. The medium of radical politics,
to adapt McLuhan, is its message. What I am suggesting is not that
fatuous liberal distinction between "violent protest" and "peaceful dis-
sent." "Violence" and "disorder" have come to mean in the rhetoric
of liberal debate those expressions of emotions that cannot be readily
tamed or manipulated by the liberal imagination. "Breaches of the
peace" and "criminal trespass"--the rubrics under which much radical
dissent has been punished-are not as harmful to the person or prop-
erty of others as they are disruptive of the complacency with which
many members of the adult population experience the world and the
things that are in it. In my father's house, a breach of the King's Peace
was not so much a threat to his property as it was an assault upon his
peace of mind.
The new style of political expression-in its emotional intensity and
improvisational spirit, in its nonverbal and erotic expressiveness, and
its sense of participation and community-is closer to radical theatre
than it is to the town meeting that provided Professor Meiklejohn with
his model of political freedom.27 It is, in Norman Mailer's provocative
phrase, "revolution by theater and without a script,"28 and it is pro-
foundly disorienting. For a culture that has been accustomed to speech
that Paul Goodman has described as "insensitive, prosy, affectless, mo-
notonous, stereotyped in content, inflexible in rhetorical attitude, me-
chanical in syntax"- 9  in short, a speech that has been cut off from
ourselves-the style of radical politics is indeed violent, in the way in
25. Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47, 52 (1919).
26. Bentley, The Unliberated University, 5 NEw Am. RE%,. 81, 95 (1969).
27. A. MEIKLEJOHN, PourircAL FRyEmom: TE CoNsrrrtoN A. Powras oF Tim PFoPLt
24-7 (1965).
28. N. MAWLER, THE A- ims oF THE NIGHT 247 (1968).
29. F. PERs, R. HIEFFERtmE & P. GOODem, GFSTALT TImiAPy: cTL 'rr'F%'I AND
GRourH Im THE Hu.u PERSONALITY 521 (1951).
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which explosions into anger, joy, tears and orgasm are violent. Tile
energies of activist youth, the tidal movements of militant racial groups
and the radical life styles of the Hippies, the Yippies, Ken Kesey's
Merry Pranksters and other parapolitical groups are generating new
dimensions of sensibility and political consciousness that cannot, and
will not, be pressed into legal molds that were made for another age.80
Underlying the sit-ins, the demonstrations, the draft-card burnings,
guerilla theatre (e.g., burning money at Wall Street; removing the arms
from the clock in Grand Central Station; the Big Pie Prank at the
opening of the San Francisco Film Festival), the underground news-
papers, the music of protest, and rock festivals like Woodstock, are
the seeds of radically new communities, public arenas (or "theatres of
the street"), and modes of communication that are developing in the
midst of (and in burlesque of) the traditional political forums-the
town meetings, the "marketplace" of ideas, the convention, the com-
mittee system, the lecture hall. At the heart of this new movement is a
reaction against what Susan Sontag in her essay Against Interpretation
has described as "the hypertrophy of the intellect at the expense of
energy and sensual capability."31
We continue to talk about the first amendment in Constitutional
Law classes as if street-corner speeches, letters-to-your-Congressman,
pamphleteering, petitions, and letters-to-the-editor were still effective
forms of political dissent. One need only to have observed the 1968
30. See Jerome, The American Academy 1970, CHANGE IN HIGHER EDUCATION, Sept.-Oct.
1969, at 32: "The youth class intends to overthrow a way of life embodied in us--the
beneficiaries of the present system. They want to get us at the gut level, and that is where
they have aimed, flouting us with their dope [see Leary v. United States, 395 U.S. 6, 41 &
n.78 (1969)], and rock [see Ferrell v. Dallas Independent School Dist., 393 F.2d 67, (5
Cir.), cert. denied, 89 S. Ct. 545 (1968)] and obscenity fsee Goldberg v. Regents of Univer-
sity of California, 57 Cal. Rptr. 463 (Dist. Ct. App. (1967)] and hair [see Breen v. Kahil,
296 F. Supp. 702, 705 and n.3 (W.D. Wis. 1969)].' See generally Frtedenberg, The Revolt
Against Democracy, CHANGE, may-June 1969, at 12 ("Potblowing is ideological"); 11,
DRAPER, BEEELEy: THE STUDENT REVOLT 140-42 (discussing the ideology of the "Filthy
Speech Movement"); Rosenstone, "The Times They Are A-Changin'": The Music of Pro.
test, 382 ANNALS 131 (1969).
One commentator has explained the political function of long hair, freaky clothes
and drugs as follows:
Precisely because the established order today is so pervasive and encompassing ...
it is not only directly powerful but also enonnously absorptive and hard to con-
front. It takes extreme behavior and attitudes to establish and make stick any dif-
ference from and opposition to such a system. There seems to be no effective way
to be moderately different and independent. For this reason, beyond and in addition
to any other values and functions, the characteristic features of the drug move-
ment's life style-not only long hair and odd costumes but especially the open use
of drugs-must not only be different from the ordinary but blatantly so. High visibil
ity of the withdrawal from straight society is essential for the movement's existence.
Weakland, Hippies: What the Scene Means, in SocIary AND DRUGS 343, 365 (R. Blm ed,
1969).
31. S. SONTAG, AGAINST INTERPRETATION AND OTHER ESSAys 7 (1966).
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Democratic National Convention or to have followed the strategies
devised by national leaders to manipulate public opinion through the
mass media with respect to United States policy in Vietnam to realize
that as a method of effecting social and political change, the traditional
forms are dead.32 The difficulty is that while all speakers are free to
express their views, not all can speak with equal effectiveness. As one
court has suggested, when loudspeakers take the form of television
and other electronic media, "a debate in which only one party has the
financial resources ... to purchase sustained access to the mass com-
munications media is not a fair test of either an argument's truth
or its innate popular appeal." 33 When the law fails to recognize new
media of protest-the language of the theatre and the drama of the
streets, forms of expression that many citizens find interfere with their
normal "peace and quiet"-that failure, in effect, constitutes a deci-
sion to silence a new politics, however neutral the legal rhetoric in
which the policy of repression is wrapped may appear. Moreover, some
of those citizens deserve to have their quiet disturbed. If we are to
have a viable constitutional theory of political expression, we must be
prepared to include among our models of human communication the
radical theatre, the new media, and the therapeutic community.
On another level, viewing the "generation gap" as a manifestation
of class conflict may move us toward a reassessment of our assumptions
about those laws that have served the adult population so well and so
long in regulating "the well-being of its children."34 I am not talking
here merely of providing young people with lawyers in juvenile courts
or other procedural safeguards,35 but of beginning to dismantle the
entire legal apparatus regulating the conduct of adolescents. Laws
making it an offense for a seventeen-year-old to be "idle"30 or "im-
moral" 37 or "dissolute" 3 or "habitually disobedient"3' 0 or "truant"40 or
"uncontrolled"4' raise very serious questions about the extent to which
young people, as a systematically discriminated-against minority, have
been denied the equal protection of the law. Intolerably vague, most of
32. Cf. N. PosmsA & C. WAInGAmRT, Tk.cimG AS A SunlEsE Acrnm 8 (1969).
33. Banzhaf v. F.C.C., 405 F.2d 1082, 1102 (D.C. Cir. 196S), cert. denied, 90 S.
Ct. 50. (1969).
34. Ginsberg v. New York, 390 US. 629, 639 (1968).
35. Cf. In re Gault, 387 US. 1 (1967).
36. CAL. WVz-. & INsT. CODE § 601 (West 1966).
87. Id.
38. Id.
59. AAz REv. STAT. § 8-201(6)(b).
40. Id. § 8-201(6)(c).
41. Id. § 8-201(6)(b).
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these categories have no objective behavioral criteria, but represent the
lunatic efforts of parents, teachers and police to trap the energies of the
young in a grid of adult expectations that have been drained of any
sense of growth or life.42 Even those types of juvenile offenses that
correspond to categories of adult criminality-malicious mischief, joy.
riding, assault, petty theft and sexual offenses-are rarely manifesta-
tions of a commitment to a criminal career.43 More often, they are the
vehicles through which an adolescent strains to achieve his own identity
and confirm his sexuality, to experience and sharpen the boundaries
of his body and the limits of his self.44 The boys, as Lemert" and
others have pointed out, are often punished for "hell[ing] around" or
"living it up" or "giving the old man a taste of his own medicine." As
for the girls, Berger in Hair is more direct: they're "busted for (their]
beauty."46 If our juvenile courts, as they are presently administered,
42. See Friedenberg, The Image of the Adolescent Minority, in E. FRIEDENorO0, Tat
DIGNITY OF YOUTH & OTHER ATAVIS,MIS 66, 69-70 (1965): "In my experience, it is just not
possible to discuss adolescence with a group of American adults without being forced into
the topic of juvenile delinquency. Partly this is an expression of legitimate concern, but
partly it is because only the JD has any emotional vividness to them ...They hate and
fear the kinds of spontaneity [and sexuality] that remind them of what they have aban.
doned, and they hate themselves for having joined forces with and having come to re-
semble their oppressors ... I am convinced that [this] is ... the source of the specific
hostility- and sometimes sentimentality-that adolescents arouse in adults. See Board of
Directors v. Green, 259 Iowa 1260, 147 N.W.2d 854 (1967) (school regulation excluding mar.
ried students from participation in extracurricular activities); State ex rel. Idle V. Chain.
berlin, 12, Ohio Misc. 44, 175 N.E.2d 539 (C.P. 1961) (school board rule requiring pregnant
students to withdraw from school attendance); Perry v. Grenada Mun. Separate School
Dist., Civ. No. W.C. 6736 (N.D. Miss., Dec. 27, 1967) (exclusion of unwed mother from
school "as a threat to the moral health . . of all other teenage girls.'); Ferrell v. Dallas
Independent School Dist., 261 F. Supp. 545 (N.D. Tex. 1966), aff'd, 393 F.2d 697 (5 Cir),
cert. denied, 89 S. Ct. 98 (1968) (upholding school rule prohibiting long hair as valid
regulation of "lewd" appearance). See generally S. Goldstein, The Scope and Sources of
School Board Authority to Regulate Student Conduct and Status: A Noneonstitutional
Analysis, 117 U. PA. L. Rv. 373, 405-25 (1969).
43. See D. MATZA, DELINQUENCY AND DsuFr 22 (1964).
44. See Erikson, Identity v. Identity Diffusion in Adolescence in NEW PERSpErcivrS ron
RESEARCH ON JUVENILE DELINQUENCY 9-10 (H. Witmer & R. Kotinsky eds., 1956); W. GtAs.
sE, REALITY THERAPY 85 (1965).
45. PRESmENT'S CO IISSION ON LAW ENFORCEMENT AND ADMINISTRATION or JUSTICE,
TASK FORCE REPORT: JUVENILE DELINQUENCY AND CRIME, 91, 94 (1967).
46. From the song Donna in Hair, copyright 1967-68 James Rado, Gerome Ragni,
Galt McDermot, Nat Shapiro, United Artists Music Co. Inc. The Children's Bureaut re-
ported that almost 10 per cent of the referrals of girls to court in delinquency cages In
1962 were in the category of "sex offenses" (exclusive of forcible rape), while another 18
per cent were classified as "ungovernable" and 25 per cent as "runaways." U.S. CIItL-
DREN'S BUREAU, STAT. SERIES No. 73, TABLE 5 (1963), reprinted in C. FooTm, R. Lxvy &
F. SANDER, CASES AND MATERIALS ON FAMILY LAW 396 (1966). The latter two categories
frequently involve some kind of sexual escapade. See A. Ccour.L, Tsn. SOCIAL OtOA-
NIZATION OF JUVENILE JUSTICE 119 (1968); Reiss, Sexual Offenses: The Marginal Status
of the Adolescent, in SEXUAL DEVIANCE 47 (J. Gagnon & W. Simons eds. 1967).
Edgar Friedenberg has pointed out that our society represses its awareness of the
adolescent girl, even though the media are saturated with her image. "[G]irls, like Jews,"
he observes, "are not supposed to fight back; we expect them, instead, to insinuate them-
selves coyly into the roles available. In our society, there are such lovely things for them
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are accomplishing anything, they are transforming the energies of the
young into delinquent careers.47
The administration of mass compulsory education itself presents
profound issues about the viability of institutions that, after prisons
and mental hospitals, house the most coercive, deforming and humiliat-
ing environments in our culture. Peter Matin, in one of the best articles
that I know of on youth in our culture, has described how our frac-
tured visions of adolescence, if not of life itself, have produced a legal
and educational system that has attempted to freeze young people into
a state of "prolonged childhood . . . that resists change even as the
culture itself and its needs shift radically." 48 The problem, Marin
writes, is that our institutions "are geared to another century, another
set of social necessities, and cannot change quickly enough to contain,
receive, or direct [our youth]-and as we supress or refuse them they
turn to rage."' ' 9
III. Toward a Humanistic View of Legal Education
"You must think first."
"But it came out fine."
"It might not have," and all the terrible things that might have
happened are explained to me, and I am told that I must look into
all the possibilities and not take the chances that I do.
to be. They can take care of other people and dean up after them. Women can become
wives and mothers; Jews can become kindly old Rabbis and philosophers and even psy-
choanalysts and lovable comic essayists. They can become powers behind the power, a
fine old law firm runs on the brains of its anonymous young Jews just as a husband's
best asset is his loyal and unobtrusive wife. A Jewish girl can become a Jewih mother,
and this is a role which even Plato would have called essential." Friedenberg. The Image
of the Adolescent Minority. supra note 42, at 75-76 (1965). Cf. Duffiles v. Duffies, 75 Wis.
374, 45 N.W. 522 (1890) ("The wife is more domestic [than the husband] .... She is
purer and better by nature than her husband, and more governed by pfinciple and a
sense of duty and right, and she seldom violates her marriage obligations, or abandons
her home.'). See generally Reiss, supra this note, at 50-51.
47. See E. ERIKSON, IDENTITY: YOUTH AND CRustS 255-56 (1968); F. T tFu nu.mt, C IME
AND THE Co.ATzuNrry 19-20 (1938).
48. Main, The Open Truth and Fiery Vehencnce of Youth, CE,%,rE NAGAZINE, Feb.
1969, at 61, 66.
49. Id. 64. The "solutions" put forth by lawyers to the "problem of student unrest,"
which is seen as a form of "social pathology" have been "legalistic sets of rules and proce-
dures for 'communication' ... and elaboration of legal techniques--from the injunction
to calling the National Guard-to be used when such rules are violated." Lauter & Alex-
ander, AGE: Defender of the Educational, in THE PoLrrics or Scuoi.Atsniu, 29 A nrioat
Ravamv 287, 301 (1969). The point that the "procedural liberals" fail to grasp is that the
issue is not "communication" or "tactics" or "procedure," but change in te relationships
between the students and the University and between the University and other institu.
dons. See Schwartz, Comment, in Symposium on Legal Aspects of Student-hustilutional
Relationships, 45 DENvR L.J. 525 (1968). For one of the few sane perceptions of the role
of the law in responding to student protest, see Farer, The Arny of Sanctions, in Swmu,,r
PROT-sr AND THE IkAw 67 (G. Holmes ed. 1969).
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"Always later, later, later ("when I retire") for life and living,
for what sings in me in the beginning and later fizzles to a whimper.
Pie-in-the-sky-laughed out of the hereafter and accepted here on
earth as making sense.
"Can't we ever live now?"
-Barry Stevens50
There has been an incredible volume of literature published in the
last twenty years about law school education. The overwhelming con-
cern, however, is with curriculum, methodology and casebooks. We
rarely hear anything about teaching.r' I am not talking about that bag
of tricks called classroom "techniques"-any fool can learn them in
time-but about teaching as that "complex and perilous relationship
between a teacher and his student" 2-as an honest meeting between
man and man. There is not much meeting or sharing or enjoying in
our law schools. There's no time for it. We're so busy planning for
the future-for the future careers of students, for our own future
careers as teachers, for the destiny of the law school-that we have no
time to live in the now.
When I first came to teaching two years ago, I had it in mind to
emulate the style of some of my own teachers whose verbal art had
made them so deadly, so omnipotent in the classroom. But, I find that
pedagogical mimesis-teaching as an imitation of teaching-does not
work very well for me. The only time that anything really happens
in my classes is when I start being the person I really am-with feel-
ings, doubts, expectations, fears-and not the incarnation of some pro-
fessional or academic role. Lawyers and law students, though, are
especially resistant to efforts to get them in touch with their feelings.
Of all the admonitions of the Greek philosopher, the one which we
self-styled Socratics most persistently and flagrantly ignore is: Know
thyself. Between law teacher and law student there is a silent con-
spiracy to preserve what Alan Watts calls "the taboo against knowing
who you are."' 3
Teachers and students must meet face to face, but that will never
50. C. ROGERS & B, STEVENS, PERSON TO PERSON: THE PROBLEM OF BrIN0 HUMAN 43.44(1967).
51. Among the new exceptions are Hutchins, The University Law School, in TiuE LAW
SCHOOL OF ToMoRROW (D. Haber & J. Cohen eds. 1968); Reich, Toward the Humanistic
Study of Law, 74 YALE L.J. 1402 (1965); Watson, The Quest for Professional Compotonce:
Psychological Aspects of Legal Education, 37 U. CNN. L. REV. 93 (1968).
52. S. Shapiro, The Student and the Teacher: Face to Face 2 (mimeographed document
on ifie in Yale Law Library).
53. A. WATTS, THE BOOK (1967).
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happen until we remove our academic masks and put an end to those
degradation ceremonies we politely call the "Socratic method." At a
time when law students throughout the country are expressing pro-
found dissatisfaction with the second and third years in the house that
Langdell built, we might take notice of John Holt's dictum regarding
education in our elementary schools which applies with equal force to
our law schools: students outplayed or overplayed at the word game
will after awhile simply stop playing it."
The "Socratic Method" and Other Games
One problem with the "Socratic method" as it is usually practiced is
the failure at some point to make explicit for students the nature of the
strategies we use to defeat them or the processes by which they defeat
themselves. 55 We expose students to intellectual battle without ever
providing them with an arsenal of skills, and that seems a little unfair,
especially when we stay up half the night writing and rehearsing the
script for the military drama we stage the next day. Or else, if we are
more experienced in the art, we take a few more risks with a little less
preparation, but we still expect a student to learn the skill ritual-
istically-by subjecting him to the initiation rites of public humilia-
tion, sarcasm and ridicule. There is something about that form of
pedagogy that is a little like teaching a physics student Newton's laws
of motion by dropping him from a third story window or running him
down the street. I am not suggesting that we coddle him into compe-
tence or that we not expose him to the experiential drama of vigorous
discourse, but that we stop practicing the dialectical art in a way that
conceals more art than it reveals.
The Socratic method, as it is usually administered in the classroom,
consists largely of a set of "games," the most popular of which is
"Comer," 56 a strategy that bears a striking resemblance to the ancient
ploys of Zen masters.57 The objective in each case is to drive the stu-
dent into a corner by refuting any position he takes. In being presented
with a zoan (a Zen question) or a Socratic question, the student is cast
on the horns of a dilemma: he is made to feel that there is some answer
54. J. Holt, Introduction to H. Koim, TEACH G THE "UNTEACEADLE" 9 (1957).
55. One luminous exception is the pioneering course, "Lav, Language and Ethics"
taught by Christopher Stone and William Bishin at the University of Southern California
Law School. See Reisman, In Memory of Harold TV. Soloman: Comments on Southern
California's Flyer in Legal Education, 41 S. CAL. L. REv. 506 (1968).
56. See E. BERNE, GA mEs PEoPLE PLAY 92-5 (1964). See generally E. BN'E, TnASAc.
TiONAL ANALYSIS su PsycnoHOTmAPY (1961).
57. See A. WATTS, PsYCnoTmERY EAst & Wrsr 148-61 (1969).
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he must find, but in seeking it out, he begins to despair of finding it
because everything he says is rejected as wrong. This is a version of the
"double-bind" first described by Gregory Bateson and his colleagues in
an article entitled Toward a Theory of Schizophrenia1s The feelings
experienced by a student exposed to this double-binding have been
described as follows:
By careful questioning the dialectician finds out what . . . [the
student's] opinion is, and then challenges the student to propose
and defend it. Naturally, the defense fails, and to the degree that
the student is emotionally dependent upon his opinion, he begins
to feel insecure, not just intellectually but psychologically and
even physically. He therefore looks about him for some other
premise to which he can hold, but as he takes up such alternatives
the dialectician disposes of them one after another. At this point
the student begins to feel a kind of vertigo because it seems that he
has no basis from which to think and act .... Left to himself in
this predicament, he might well go out of his mind...
Here is the experience described by a first-year law student:
Well, Professor [X] ... is unprincipled, he will never let you know
which side he is on. He usually gets the kids angered in class be-
cause he never lets them know what's right. He says he's just up
there to ask questions. He could drive you mad asking all the
questions he does .... 0
Bateson and others have demonstrated that "double-binding" in
parent-child communications is a significant etiological factor in the
development of schizophrenic conditions in children. Are we also driv-
ing our students mad in the classroom by subjecting them to this
paradoxical form of communication?
The difference between the use of the zoan and the purpose of the
Socratic dialogue is that the intention of the Zen master is not t6 teach
the student a method for winning arguments, but to demonstrate the
futility of argument:
When you stop thinking about the answer, you will stop asking
the question. 1
The Zen game, then, is actually a counter-game, a game to end games.
Practiced in this way, with the Zen master there to assure the student,
58. Bateson, Jackson, Haley & WeakIand, Toward a Theory of Schizophrenia, I Dr-.
HAViOR1AL SciENcE 251 (1956).
59. A. WATrs, supra note 57, at 161.
60. Silver, Anxiety and the First Semester of Law School, 1968 Wis. L. REv. 1201, 1203.
61. A. WATS, supra note 57, at 147; see A. WATTs, TnIV WAY ov Z N 126-33 (1957).
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"not by argument, but by personality, that it is possible to have passed
through this crisis with gain rather than loss of sanity,0 2 the game of
"Corner" can be a therapy that has the effect of liberating the student
from his efforts to intellectualize his experience. Used as a method of
intellectual inquiry, it is a form of mental illness. The potential uses
of this dialogue between teacher and student thus present us with the
alternatives of enlightenment and madness: the classroom as carnival
(a game-house), asylum (a mad-house) or therapeutic community (a
house of learning).
A variation of the game of "Corner" is "One-up":
Student: "Do you think that custodial interrogation in the absence
of counsel is a violation of the dignity of the individual?"
Teacher: "What do you mean by 'dignity'?"
The student wants to know where his teacher stands on the issue of
providing people with lawyers. The teacher evades the question by
changing the subject to philosophy. 3 The student can never win. The
teacher is always one-up. If the student presses the question, he loses
because he has "failed" to define his terms. If he switches to philosophy,
his inquiry has been derailed. Nor can he comment about what the
teacher is doing for, in the classroom, metacommunication is tanta-
mount to insubordination.
Then there is the familiar "chamber of horrors" gambit-the logical
paradigm of which is the reductio ad absurdum argument-or what I
prefer to call the game of "Now I've Got You, You Son-Of-A-Bitch.""
By the time a law student reaches his second year, he knows the game
and either stops playing it, plays along cynically, or initiates the
counter-game of "Wooden Leg"65 ("What can you expect of a 'dumb'
student like me") or a variation of "Gee, You're Wonderful, Profes-
sor." 66 Another popular pasttime of professors that often passes for
Socratic dialogue is the game of "Guess What I'm Thinking"; the
student counter-game is "Mindreading I, II or III," depending on the
number of previous courses the student has had with the professor.
When frustration reaches the boiling point in the third year and
breaks out in the form of criticism or rebellion, the faculty game be-
comes "But Look How Hard I'm Trying."6
62. A. WATiS, supra note 57, at 161.
63. Cf. E. BERNE, G.,mrs PEoPLE PL4Y 94-95 (1964).
64. Cf. id. 85-86.
65. Cf. id. 159-62.
66. Cf. id. 152-53.
67. Cf. id. 106-07.
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We pride ourselves in teaching students how to "think like lawyers."
But our present educational processes do more to effect thought reform
than to offer instruction in logical analysis. Teaching how to "think
like a lawyer" is closer to building character than it is to constructing
syllogisms. That captivating phrase defines not an intellectual process,
but a process of socialization enforced by putting students through
some form of suffering and aimed at the production of reliable and
predictable people who will be readily assimilated into the Bar
Association.68
The first year, of course, is critical. The Socratic dialogue at that
point has many of the properties of a "degradation ceremony," '' de-
signed as it is to accomplish the ritualistic destruction of prior modes
of classroom behavior and their replacement with a standardized pat-
tern of response through the public humiliation of deviant students.
I have seen exceptionally creative students emerge from classes in
pieces after having been decimated by the ridicule of a professor. There
is little consolation that I, or anyone else, can offer them for the out-
rage and humiliation they have experienced in the presence of their
peers. I know they are bright and capable, but their classroom experi-
ences tell them they are dull and stupid. Even the "good" students are
casualties of the system. There are thousands of them in our law schools
who are just marking time, waiting to graduate, who will pass through
the portals of our academies so perfectly untouched by anything that
has happened within its walls that the recollection of their lives there
will be like the memory of a dreamless sleep.
If real learning is to take place, we must begin with a radical re-
assessment of our ideas about education; I mean start from the be.
ginning. In the beginning-in kindergarten (literally, "garden of
children," a place where children grow)-life is learning and learning
is life. But as the individual moves through the educational system,
he becomes increasingly estranged from the sources of life, In our
elementary and secondary schools, the compartmentalization of experi-
ence begins: learning is learning and life is life. In college, learning is
anti-learning and life is learning. Finally, in our professional schools,
learning becomes anti-life (a manipulation of life) and life becomes
68. See Moore, Occupational Socialization, in HANDBooK OF SOCALZATION 'ITIEOliY AND
REsEAR H 861, 878-79 (D. Goslin ed. 1968).
69. See Garfinkel, Conditions of Successful Degradation Ceremonies, 61 Ams. J. So-
CIOLOGY 420 (1956).
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anti-learning (the end of life)30 In the rush to meet the deadlines we
have set for ourselves, to get a-head, to move up, we lose touch with
our selves.
What we need is an awareness and understanding of the emotional
landscape of the educational environment-a rediscovery of the well-
springs of human growth where all potential for real learning resides.
The trouble with our existing forms of education is that they are
anchored to a dualistic vision of man that forces the splitting and
polarization of "intellect" and "feeling," of "mind" and "body." To
be rational, to control yourself, to be objective and uninvolved, is
good. To be irrational, to lose your head, to be subjective and emo-
tionally involved, is bad.
If we insist upon denying what is part of us, of cutting off our hearts
and living in our heads, then we commit ourselves to an especially
pernicious form of madness. To be suffering from schizophrenia is,
literally, to be suffering from a broken heart.
There is much talk about maturity and adaptation, about the need
to adjust to reality. Ronald Laing,71 Frederick Perls, 2 George Leon-
ard 3 and others, however, have begun to challenge our conventional
notions about normality and maturity, about the effect of families and
schools upon our children and students. The contemporary family,
Laing suggests, functions as a vehicle through which the experience of
children is invalidated by the mystifying rhetoric of love, discipline,
and morality, and through which they are encouraged to experience
life in substantially the same way as everyone else.74 Our schools have
a similar effect: to delude students out of their own personal worlds;
to persuade them that their personal fantasies are psychopathic while
our "socially shared hallucinations" are sane:
At least some of us have managed to hate what [our parents and
teachers] have made of us. Inevitably we see ... [them] as the
reflection . .. of our own self-division .... [but they already]
have become installed in our hearts, and we call them ourselves.
70. Cf. Kasamets, Eight Edicts on Education with Eighteen Elaborations, 2 Sounei:
MUSIC or THE AvANT GARDE 37, 41 (1968).
71. R. LAInG, THE POLITICS oF ExEIEN E (1967).
72. F. Pzuis, GESTALT THERAPIY VERDATLm (1969); F. PERES, R. HEFEU.M'E, P. GOOD-
MAN, GESTALT THERAPY: ExcrrFNr Am GRowrir IN THE HUmAN PERsoNAL-r, (1951).
73. G. LEONARD, EDUCATION AND ECSTASY (1968).
74. R. LAING, supra note 71, at 57-76; Laing, Mystification, Confusion, and Conflict, in
INTENSIVE FAimY THERAPY 343 (1. Boszormenyi-Nagy & J. Framo eds. 1965).
75. R. LAmN, supra note 71, at 74.
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There remains somehow an imagination, a passion, an enormous
potential for learning in students that can be unlocked if only they are
permitted to be themselves, if only we start conceiving of knowledge
as a function of inner experience rather than a surrender to orthodoxy
or whatever it is that students can be cajoled, conned or hypnotized
into accepting as "reasonable:"
Even broken hearts have been known to mend if only we have the
heart to let them3 6
A Place for Feeling in the Life of the Law
At a Conference on Educational Reform which I attended at Dart-
mouth College in the spring of 1967, I was ungently dislodged from
my complacent notions about teaching by students from all over the
country who, as one of them has put it, "want to stop hearing about
being nice and start learning to be free." The pain, the rage, the
frustration, the tears and the joy that were expressed during the three
days of that conference, unrestrained by rules or agenda and uncon-
taminated by politeness or deference, contrasted starkly with the emo-
tional desiccation of my nicely managed classes. But more than any-
thing else I was struck by the conspicuous omission of any reference
to or concern about what was going on in the professional schools.
The lack of interest, I was eventually informed, was based on the
almost universal assumption that the professional schools-the law
schools, in particular-were so far beyond the pale of redemption that
it was futile even to talk about them. The feeling shared by many
students was that law schools are places where old men in their twenties
go to die. They were appalled by the incredible insensitivity of lau
schools to human needs, their monumental indifference to economic
exploitation and social inequality, and their dedication to training
ranks of law students to think like hired guns rather than to argue
from personal conviction. The law school was seen as the deep-freeze
of the emotional life of the university.
Neither the legal tradition nor the liberal temperament, which feeds
a large part of contemporary legal theory, has ever been very hospitable
to the life of feeling. Writing about liberalism in America, Lionel
Trilling has called our attention to the paradoxical relation in which
it stands to the emotions. 7 While liberalism is theoretically "concerned
with the emotions above all else, as proof of which the word happi-
76. Id. 130.
77. L. TRiLLING, THE LiBELAL IMAGINATION at x (1953).
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ness stands at the very center of its thought," Trilling writes, in its
effort to carry out it political ends, "it drifts toward a denial of the
emotions and the imagination."78
John Stuart Mill, during a period of emotional depression in his
early twenties, became aware that the Benthamite ideal of human hap-
piness held a negative and narrow view of human nature because, in
its predilection for rational calculation, it had a tendency to impoverish
the feelings and the imagination. As Wordsworth put it, "it murders
to dissect."7' 9 Mill urged liberals to read Wordsworth and Coleridge,
Trilling tells us, to recall them to the power of poetry. He wanted to
remind them that imagination is "properly the joint possession of the
emotions and the intellect, that it is fed by the emotions, and that
without it the intellect withers and dies, that without it the mind can-
not work and cannot properly conceive itself."80
The polarization of "intellect" and "feeling" is etched in the de-
velopment of the law itself. Nowhere is the conflict dramatized more
forcefully than in the area of obscenity.81 Ideas about sex, the Supreme
Court has said, like political or economic ideas, are constitutionally
protected, no matter how offensive they may be to the moral sensibility
of the community.6 The expression of sexual feelings, however-
78. Id. x, xi.
79. See 2 INTRODuCrIoN TO CoN=%rMPORARY CVILIzATION IN THE W sr 440 (3d ed. 1954).
Mill wrote of this period in his life:
For I now saw, or thought I saw, what I had always before received with incredulity
-that the habit of analysis has a tendency to wear away the feelings: as indeed it has,
when no other mental habit is cultivated, and the analysing spirit remains without
its natural complements and correctives... Analytic habits may thus even strengthen
the associations between causes and effects, means and ends, but tend altogether to
weaken those which are, to speak familiarly, a mere matter of feeling. They are there-
fore (I thought) favourable to prudence and clearsightedness, but a perpetual worm
at the root both of the passions and of the virtues; and, above all, fearfully under-
mine all desires, and all pleasures .... My education, I thought, had failed to create
these feelings in sufficient strength to resist the dissolving influence of analysis, while
the whole course of my intellectual cultivation had made precocious and premature
analysis the inveterate habit of my mind ... . I had now learnt by experience that
the passive susceptibilities needed to be cultivated as well as the active capacities ....
The cultivation of the feelings became one of the cardinal points in my ethical and
philosophical creed.
J. Minr, AUTOBIOGRAPHY 137-44 (1923) (emphasis added).
80. L. Tkum.G, supra note 77, at xi. See J. ML.L, ON BE'..trA A.xD Co.amcE 96-168
(1950).
81. See Finnis, "Reason and Passion":. The Constitutional Dialectic of Free Speech and
Obscenity, 116 U. PA. L. Rav. 222 (1967).
82. Kingsley Intl Pictures Corp. v. Regents, 360 US. 684 (1959):
What New York has done, therefore, is to prevent the exhibition of a motion picture
because the picture advocates an idea-that adultery under certain circumstances may
be proper behavior. Yet the First Amendment's basic guarantee is of freedom to ad-
vocate ideas ... . Its guarantee is not confined to the expression of ideas that are
conventional or shared by a majority. It protects advocacy of the opinion that
adultery may sometimes be proper, no less than advocacy of socialism or the single
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which is what "obscenity" is all about-is another matter.83 Unless it
is redeemed by some "saving intellectual content,"84 the communica-
tion of erotic feelings is not entitled to the benefit of the First Amend-
ment. Here, the life of the mind and the life of the body have been
divorced and the latter evicted from the mansion of the law, left to
pursue a career of its own in the underworld of erotica. The legal
temperament, after many years, has finally become receptive to sex in
the head, but is having much more difficulty with sex in the body as a
viable human experience. "Polymorphous perversity" is crime in most
jurisdictions" and as Norman 0. Brown has observed: "[I]f infantile
sexuality, judged by the standard of normal adult sexuality, is perverse,
by the same token normal adult sexuality, judged by the standard of
infantile sexuality, is an unnatural restriction of the erotic poten-
tialities of the human body."86 The politics of pleasure is transformed
into a drama of evil in the house of the Law.
In the world of political discourse, speech that is exclusively emotive
in its import-calling a police officer a "fascist pig" for example-has
been disinherited by the law since it is "no essential part of any
exposition of ideas."8' 7 The theoretical exposition of fascism, however,
is protected.
The invidious constitutional distinctions between intellect and feel-
ings, between the life of the mind and the life of the body, are rooted
in the same dualism from which the traditional first amendment di-
chotomy between thoughts and acts spring. The expression of feelings
is largely the language of the body; it is, in Kenneth Burke's phrase,
"the language of symbolic action."881 For example, I can talk about
being angry without ever feeling angry. It is not until I clench my fist
tax. And in the realm of ideas it protects expression which is eloquent no less than
that which is unconvincing.
360 U.S. at 688-689 (emphasis added).
83. In Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476 (1957), the Supreme Court defined "obscene"
material as material dealing with sex in a manner appealing to "prurient interest" and
defined "prurient" in part as "itching; longing; uneasy with desire or longing; of persons,
having itching, morbid, or lascivious longzngs;. 54 U.S. at n.20 (emphasis added).
Pornography is the expressin, "distorted by represson, of the Immortal desires of the
hua eat"N.BONLr GA~TDET 3 15).C.Srgent, W1d Poets, In E,
intercourse).86. N. BRoWN, Lsvx AG~ANST Dx.a' 27 (1959).
87. Chapliasky v. New Hampshire, 315 US. 568, 572 (1942). See People v. Cohen, 1
Cal. App. 3dl 94, 81 Cal. Rptr. 503 (1969) ("Fuck the Draft'); Goldberg V. Regents of
University of California, 248 Cal. App. 2d 867, 57 Cal, ltptr, 463 (fist. Ct. App. 1967)
("Filthy Speech Movement"). Cf. Street v. New York, 394 US,. 576 (1969),88. K. BuRxE, LANGUAGE As Sxasoto AcroN (1966).
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and get in touch with the tightness in my jaw and the quivering in my
stomach that I begin to experience real anger.80 Because the expression
of emotion entails some motor activity of the body, it is closer to
"action" than intellectual speech which purports to present us only
with ideas for contemplation. The expression of feeling also entails
making contact with the environment; in the case of anger, of contact-
ing the object of one's rage. There is, then, in every emotive expres-
sion an element of assault. Indeed, among nonliterate peoples, "words
play the part essentially of implements . . [and] are regarded as
capable of doing things .... "O Language, in its most primitive func-
tion is really "a mode of action rather than . . . a countersign of
thought."'91
The extreme form of contact in the case of anger is homicide or the
infliction of serious physical injury, which the law obviously must
prohibit in the absence of justification or excuse. There are other
modes of expressing emotion and making contact, however, that are
not really dangerous, and constitute a vital part of human experience,
but which are also forbidden. These include emotive language, certain
forms of symbolic conduct, and the expression and gratification of
sexual feelings. For some reason that is not entirely clear-perhaps
(as I have suggested) because feelings mobilize the body to action while
ideas presumably only stir our brains around a little-the law has
persisted in treating the language of the body and the language of
the mind as separate constitutional categories.
While there is no constitutional compulsion to adopt any particular
theory of human behavior, we ought at least to be aware that the per-
petuation in the law of this dualism confirms a fragmented and alien-
ated vision of man. In its insistence upon the intellectualization of
feeling as a condition of constitutional protection, the law denies what
is most deeply human in us. In its effort to preserve the distinction
between thought and acts, the law reduces human expression to an un-
ending dress rehearsal for life.
The political implications of preserving the traditional distinctions
are disturbing, if not entirely clear. Intellectual discourse alone, as
Susan Sontag has pointed out, is itself a radical political strategy "for
conserving an old text, which is thought too precious to repudiate by
89. See F. Pmms, GsTrA.T THERAPY VmA'rIm 64 (199).
90. A. MoNTAGu, TnE ANATOmY OF SwEAmG 8 (1967).
91. Malinowski, The Problem of feaning in Primitive Languages, quoted in A. AfoN-
TAGU, THE ANATOMY oF S mAmG 8 (1967).
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revamping it."92 What is important now is to recover our senses. "We
must learn to see more, to hear more, to feel more."oa In short, in
politics, as in contemporary art, the demand is not for a change in
ideational content but for a radically new aesthetics of expression,t"l
The Development of Creativity
The explorer is totally inconsistent. He never knows at what mo-
ment he will make some startling discovery. And consistency is a
meaningless term to apply to an explorer. If he wanted to be con-
sistent, he would stay home.
-Marshall McLuhanou
We are desperately in need of room for feeling not only in the
development of the law, but in the process of learning law as well. We
need what Abraham Maslow calls "a healthy irrationality" with which
to move beyond the limitations of purely abstract and logical modes
of thought.0 Humanistic psychology has made us aware that it is the
"ability of healthier people to dip into the unconscious and precon-
scious, to use and value their [feelings] ... instead of fearing them, to
accept their impulses instead of always controlling them, [that] turns
out to be one of the main conditions of creativity.""7 Research and
92. S. SONTAG, AGAINST INTERPRETATION AND OTHER ESSAYS 6 (1966).
93. Id. 14.
94. The idea of speech as symbolic action has been most tendentiously expressed by
Artaud:
We need true action, but without practical consequences .... Theater, like speech,
needs to be set free. This obstinacy in making characters talk about feelings, passions,
desires, and impulses of a strictly psychological order, in which a single word Is to
compensate for innumerable gestures, is the reason . . . the theater has lost its tru
raison d'etre . . . . [Speech should be] called upon to address not only the mind but
the senses, and through the senses to attain still richer and more fecund regions of
the sensibility at full tide . . . [L]et there be the least return to the active, plastic,
respiratory sources of language, let words be joined again to the physical motions
that gave them birth, and let the discursive, logical aspect of speech disappear be-
neath its affective, physical side ....
A. ARTAUD, THE THEATER AND ITs DouBLE 115, 118-19 (1958) (emphasis added).
95. G. STERN, McLurAN: HOT AND COOL xiii (1967).
96. A. MAsLow, TOWARD A PSYCHOLOGY OF BEING 208 (1968).
97. Id. 195. Cf. Fromm, Psychoanalysis and Zen Buddhism, in D. Suzuli, E. FRIoMM &
R. DEMARTINO, ZEN BUDDHISM & PSYCHOANALYSIS 77, 101-02 (1963):
The second aspect of the filter which makes awareness possible is the logic which
directs the thinking of people in a given culture. Just as most people assume that
their language is 'natural' and that other languages only use different words for the
same things, they assume also that the rules which determine proper thinking, are
natural and universal ones; that which is illogical in one cultural system is illogical
in any other, because it conflicts with 'natural' logic. A good example of this is tile
difference between Aristotelian and paradoxical logic . . . which assumes that A
and non-A do not exclude each other as predicates of X. Paradoxical logic was pre.
dominant in Chinese and Indian thinking, in Heraclitus' philosophy, and then again
under the name of dialectics in the thought of Hegel and Marx. The general prin.
ciples of paradoxical logic have been clearly described in general terms by Lao-Tse.
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experimentation in "synectics" has demonstrated that in the develop-
ment of creative potential, "the emotional component is more im-
portant than the intellectual, irrational more important than the
rational."9 8
In an age in which men have begun to explore outer space, a more
fantastic space odyssey awaits us: an exploration of social space-be-
tween man and man-and a journey into inner space-between a man
and his self. Only in an atmosphere of openness to the entire range
and depth of human experience can creativity flourish. This means the
learning process must include the sensory awareness, the playfulness,
the imagination and the spontaneity of expression often associated
with childhood. "[I]maginative creation," Freud wrote, "like day-
dreaming, is a continuation of and substitute for the play of child-
hood." 99 Ironically, it is the non-sense of traditional education that
lays waste the imagination of children and "turn[s] them into imbeciles
like ourselves, with high [gradepoint averages] if possible."' 00
If, as Freud made clear, the creative potential resides largely in the
unconscious, 101 then the development of creativity will depend upon
the extent to which we are successful in developing methods for making
the unconscious accessible to ourselves and sharing our creations with
others. These methods include intuition, metaphors, puns, myths, fan-
tasies, daydreams, and hypnagogic experiences. 102 Their productiveness,
in turn, depends on an atmosphere in which an individual is en-
couraged to be irrelevant, to play, to be -wrong, to take risks, to be in-
consistent, to tolerate ambiguity and to express the ridiculous. Each of
these roads to creativity has been traditionally regarded as anathema
to the legal mind and is systematically dynamited in the classroom. If
a student seeks to leave the conventional track and embark on an imag-
"Words that are strictly true seem to be paradoxical." And by Chuang.tzu: "That
which is not-one, is also one .
The third aspect of the filter, aside from language and logic, is the content of exc-
periences. Every society excludes certain thoughts and feelings from being thought,
felt, and expressed ....
We come, then, to the conclusion that consciousness and unconsciousness are so-
cially conditioned. I am aware of all my feelings and thoughts which are permitted
to penetrate the threefold filter of (socially conditioned) language, logic, and taboos
(social character) ....
98. W. GORDON, Sv ucres 6 (1961).
99. Freud, The Poet and Day-Dreaming, in S. FREuD, ON CREATIVMT AND IE UNco..
scious 52-3 (B. Nelson & J. Riviere transl. 1958).
100. R.. LArNG, THE PoLrics OF ExPERaENcE 58 (1967).
101. Freud, supra note 99, at 44-54.
102. On the hynogogic experience ("the state between waking and sleeping"), see Van
Dusen, The Natural Depth in Man, in C. ROGERS & B. STEVENS, PERSON TO PERsoN: TnE
PROBL OF BEING HUIIAN 211, 217-22 (1967).
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inative voyage of his own, the ridicule of a professor or his own fear
of being thought "irrational" eventually edits the creativity out of his
consciousness, and the student comes to learn that he must travel the
course in the same train in which everyone else is riding. The journey
out of the socially shaped compartments of our minds into the depths
of our inner space is a terribly lonely experience, for it is a place where
no one has ever been before. The frightening doubt is always there:
"Perhaps I am foolish, or wrong, or lost, or abnormal." 10
In seeking to develop "lawyering" skills, we have stubbornly re-
stricted ourselves to the cultivation of "intellect" and have ignored the
affective domain from which creativity springs. We believe either that
creativity is something that cannot be learned in the schools or that it
can be coaxed or forced, like a bowel movement from a reluctant
child, and then enforced by the training of the Socratic method.
The Socratic dialectic, though, as John Herman Randall has pointed
out, is not the discipline of symbolic logic, but rather "the imaginative
experience of the artist"' 4 -a flight of the imagination through a world
of allegories, parables and myths, a voyage through what has become
a "lost continent" in our culture. To restore that vision, to return to
the human and humanizing spirit of the dialogue in which the quest for
knowledge is propelled not by fear but by eros, to return ourselves to
our selves-and in that sense to begin to create a community in the
classroom-is, perhaps, one way in which we can begin to make of
legal education something more than a dreary task for a future payoff.
An Experiment
In a course entitled "The Family and the Law" this past year, a group
of students and I attempted to break through the highly structured and
controlled atmosphere of the traditional classroom. We experimented
with several methods, including individual and group fantasy, role-
playing,"0 5 gameplaying, nonverbal communication and videotape feed.
back. There were thirty-four of us: twenty-nine men and five women.
We met twice a week in two-hour sessions in a large, comfortable room
with a fireplace, carpeting, bookcases and usually sat in a large circle
103. Rogers, Toward a Theory of Creativity, in C. ROGERS, ON BECOMING A PersoN
347, 356 (1961).
104. Randall, Plato as the Philosopher of the Artistic Experience, 37 THE AIrntC~AN
SCHoR. 502, 509 (1968).
105. "Roleplaying" refers to the spontaneous acting out of a past, present or future
situation, either in the actor's own experience or that of another person. See R. CoPSINI,
ROLEPLAYING IN PSYCHOTHERAPY (1966). See also J. MORENO, PSYCHODRAMA (1964). MOat
court is the most familiar form of roleplaying in the law school,
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or several concentric circles. Spatial arrangements shifted with the
needs of the group. We frequently broke down into small groups of
five or six to facilitate personal interaction among group members.
Students were encouraged to stay in the here-and-now and to put them-
selves into their statements-to talk in terms of "I" or "me," rather
than referring to what "people" think or "society" says; to roleplay
cases involving attorneys and family members, rather than intellec-
tualizing about what they "would do" in a hypothetical situation; to
fantasize an observation or an idea, rather than trying to "reason it
through;" and to tune-in to nonverbal messages by imitating the bodily
positions of other members of the group and trying to experience the
corresponding feelings.
Part of the group process was dialectical. For example, a student
arguing a point might be asked to switch chairs with his adversary and
to state as persuasively as possible the adversary's position. Or I might
suggest that they continue communicating, but without using words,
only sounds and gestures. That gets them to listen to the medium
rather than the content of the communication and to see how the
voice and the body can believe the verbal message. A sometimes sober-
ing dialectical exercise that helps to break down excessive intellec-
tualization and mobilize a student to explore the emotional under-
world of his ideas is to ask him, first, to state and argue his position
on a particular issue and then to suggest that he repeat each of his
original assertions, this time adding after each one a statement like,
"And that is a lie," or "That is a lot of crap." He is then asked to
argue the opposite of his original position as emotionally and force-
fully as possible. This may be done either in pairs or in larger groups;
the important thing is to encourage each individual to experience the
polarities within himself (rather than to polarize a debate between
members of the group) by giving a voice to each part: the "conserva-
tive" part and the "radical" part; the "cynical" self and the "idealistic"
self; the "parent" and the "child;" the "top-dog" and the "under-dog."1 00
If a student really gets into these opposing parts of himself, there is
the possibility of achieving integration through awareness and appre-
ciation of the conflicting forces-which is the only kind of "synthesis"
worth pursuing.
As Edgar Bodenheimer has pointed out,10 7 the dialectical method is
106. See generally, E. SHOSmom, MAw, THE MuAMuLroa (1968).
107. Bodenheimer, A Neglected Theory of Legal Reasoning, 21 J. oF I.w. ED. 373
(1969).
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widely used in the practice of law, yet its theoretical foundations and
practical implications have been neglected both in the literature on
the logic of the law and in legal education itself. What passes for dialec-
tical discourse in the classroom is, at best, no more than a set of exer-
cises in the application of deductive inference, inductive generalization
and analogical reasoning. And much of the philosophical consideration
of the dialectical process has been permeated by metaphysical assump-
tions about the existence of some inevitable process that will lead to
the "right" or "just" result.
Most legal issues, like ethical conflicts, involve what Charles Steven-
son calls "disagreements in beliefs" and "disagreements in attitude."' 10 8
To the extent that legal arguments are based upon disagreements in
belief-e.g., whether marijuana is addictive or has harmful effects; how
important confessions are to the successful prosecution of a criminal
case; whether the death penalty has a deterrent effect-those conflicts
can eventually be resolved by the methods of science and formal logic.
But insofar as disagreement is based on disagreement in attitude-is
freedom more important than security; is privacy to be preferred to
safety; shall equality take precedence over freedom of association; is
the honor of our nation more important than human life-to this
extent, science and logic are irrelevant to the resolution of legal con-
flict. Behind every clash of values, there is a polarization of emotions
and an implicit demand that your adversary share the feelings and
attitudes that you experience with respect to a particular issue. "Abso.
lute justice," then, as Kelsen has attempted to demonstrate, "is an
irrational ideal."'10 To put it another way, the contours of our legal
norms are defined by the landscape of our emotional lives. "It is im-
possible to decide between... two conflicting judgments of value in a
rational scientific way," Kelsen writes. "It is, in the last instance, our
will, and not our reason; the emotional, and not the rational element
of our consciousness which decides this conflict."110
It is important, then, to provide a place for the life of feeling in
legal education, not just because the sharing of feelings among teachers
and students is a nice experience, but because, in the end, the process
of lawmaking is determined by undercurrents of human existence far
more subtle and profound than the shifting winds of doctrine or the
ballast of empirical data. When students seek to penetrate the fortress
108. C. STEVENSON, FACTS AND VALUES 1-9 (1963).
109. H. KELSON, WHAT IS JUSTICE? 5 (1957).
110. Id. 21.
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of value judgments implicit in legal rules, they are left at the gate-
house with some bland cliches or what Jerome Frank used to call
"weasel words" about "reasonableness" or the importance of "bal-
ancing" conflicting social interests."' These are little more than
bits of mystifying rhetoric that merely restate fundamental questions
in a way designed to discourage the student from asking them again.
Or else students are told that the function of the law is to enforce
community standards or to secure the greatest "happiness" for the
greatest number, which is nothing more than democratic propaganda
or "liberal" politics masquerading as a legal definition or a definition
of law.112
I have no objection to propaganda in the classroom-students ex-
perience it every day in our schools except that we do not like to apply
such a pejorative term to teaching American middle-class values; we
generally reserve it for teaching values we do not like.12 What is
important is that teachers make explicit their own value judgments
instead of dressing them up in the guise of "rational" and "objective"
standards-a bit of semantic sleight-of-hand that makes it so much more
difficult for students to reject the teacher's vision of the world and make
up their own minds about how the law should deal with social prob-
lems. It is through the dialectical process that the student can achieve
his own personal synthesis, but it is only when the dialectic penetrates
the intellectual layer and makes him aware of the opposing forces within
himself that he will begin to experience a meaningful integration of
ideas rather than a repetition of the old conflicts. "Internal" dialectical
arguments (which constitute the dynamics of "reasoning" about values)
are, in many ways, like dreams. The various parts and characters in the
drama of the argument, like the bits and pieces of our dreams, repre-
sent parts of ourselves; the "antithesis" in the dialectic, like the
"demons" and objects in our dreams often represent alienated parts
of ourselves, the parts we have dis-owned. I have therefore taken as a
basis for my approach to dialectical reasoning a theory of dreamwork
that has been developed in gestalt therapy:
[T]ake each one of these different items, characters, and parts,
and let them have encounters between them. Write a script. By
'wirite a script,' I mean have a dialogue between the two oppos-
ing parts and you will find-especially if you get the correct op-
111. J. FRA&NK, LAW AND THE MODERN MIND 30 (1963).
112. C. STEVESON, supra note 108, at 14-15.
113. See C. S-Ev<soN, ETHICS AND LANGUAGE 243-52 (1944).
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posites-that they always start out fighting each other. All the
different parts-any part in the [internal argument] ...is your-
self, is a projection of yourself, and if there are inconsistent sides,
contradictory sides, and you use them to fight each other, you have
the eternal conflict game, the self-torture game. As the process of
encounter goes on, there is a mutual learning until we come to an
understanding, and an appreciation of differences, until we come
to a oneness and integration of the two opposing forces. Then the
civil war is finished, and your energies are ready for your struggles
with the world. 114
The management of aggression in the classroom is another difficult
problem that we have not really faced. Andrew Watson is of the opinion
that "those who study law in the United States, as well as England,
tend to have a greater than average need to deal with this force."' 1n
And because it is so critical in the adversarial process, we need to pay
more attention to it in the educational process. It is also important to
get students in touch with their own aggressive impulses and to under-
stand the therapeutic"6 as well as the destructive uses of aggression
before they consider the role of the law in regulating social disorder
and violence. This is a point that is often overlooked. Students who
are trained in an environment in which it is disruptive to write your
name in the wrong place in an examination book and treasonable to
challenge the authority of the professor are hardly likely to have a very
sanguine view of civil disobedience or ghetto riots.
William Schutz"x7 and others" 8 have developed several methods for
using space, movement and physical contact to get people more in touch
with the feelings underlying their aggressive verbal behavior or to en-
courage quiet and passive individuals to express their aggression. These
include simple exercises such as standing on a chair to experience the
feeling of dominance in a group, thumb and arm-wrestling, pushing,
breaking into or breaking out of a circle of people, and other forms
of physical confrontation. The ancient Japanese martial art of Ailido,
recently introduced here,1 9 in its emphasis upon integrating mind and
body, has a provocative relevance to the teaching of dialectical and
adversary skills. Most of the verbal aggression I have experienced in
114. F. PEaLs, GESTALT THERAPY VEIBATIMt 71 (1969).
115. Watson, The Quest for Professional Competence: Psychological Aspects of Legal
Education, 37 U. CINN. L. Rlv. 93, 102 (1968).
116. See Coser, Some Social Functions of Violence, 364 ANNULS 8 (1966).
117. W. Scnurz, Joy, EXPANDING HUMiAN AWARENEzSS 125-26, 131-34, 156-73 (1967).
118. See, e.g., Selver, Report on Work in Sensory Awareness and Total Functioning, iII
ExPLoRATIoNs IN Hu,rAN POTENTALIIEs 487 (H. Otto ed. 1966).
119. K. ToHn, WHAT iS Aiamo? (1962).
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the classroom and the courtroom involves the use of brute force to
defeat an opponent, much the way in which physical strength is used
in arm-wrestling; and, as in arm-wrestling, where the adversaries are
equally matched, the combat results in enervating deadlock. Court-
room combat, I think, should be more like the art of Aiddo, which
is relatively effortless; you make your opponent come to you and then
use his "own strength in leading [and throwing] him:"
Let your opponent go where he wants to go; let him return where
he wants to return and bend in the direction he wants to bend as
you lead him, and then let him fall where he wants to fall. There
is no need to strain yourself unduly.'
Plaintiffs' attorneys, I suppose, will balk at this method of training, but
for defendants' attorneys, I know of no better method of teaching the
art of defense.
Another method that may be useful in helping students to get in
touch with their aggression is to suggest that individuals experiment
with new and extreme forms of responses. For example, a student who
is usually timid and withdrawn might be encouraged to be aggressive
(even to the point of obnoxiousness) during a particular class meeting;
or a student who tends to dominate the discussions might try remain-
ing silent or repeating what another student has said-that is, to give
and get feedback-before responding to it, as a way of checking out
the extent to which he is hearing what other people are saying.
Videotape was used extensively in the class as a method of providing
students with feedback to gain greater awareness of themselves and
insight into what was happening in the group. Simulated interviews
with clients were televised by group members and played back so that
students could see themselves as a client might perceive them in a real
setting.121 Before getting into these simulated interviews, I suggested
that we try a more personal, but relatively "safe" way of getting in
touch with what it is like to be involved in a helping relationship-
either as a "helper" or as a person seeking help. The class had read Carl
Rogers on "The Characteristics of a Helping Relationship,"12' but like
everything else they read, it would remain a meaningless abstraction
until they began to experience personally what Rogers was taling
about. We broke down into four or five small groups, and each member
120. Id. 17.
121. See Ramey, Teaching Medical Students by Videotape Simulation, 43 J. MEDcAL
EDUCATION 55 (1968).
122. Rogers, The Characteristics of a Helping Relationship, in C. Roso, supra note
103, at 39-57 (1961).
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was asked to write (anonymously) on a slip of paper a personal problem
with which he might go to a friend for advice. From these, a person
from each group drew one of the problems and roleplayed a person
seeking help with that problem; another group member played the
role of the helping friend. The rest of the group observed the inter-
action and then provided the "helper" with feedback after the "inter-
view" was terminated. Each encounter, including the group reaction,
was recorded on videotape and played back immediately. This was, for
many students, the most awakening experience of the class. Seeing them-
selves use facial expressions, body movements, gestures and tones of
voice which they were unaware of during the interview and listening
to other people react to what they regarded as "being helpful," students
were startled, thoughtful, amused, sobered, gratified. A student was
thereby given the opportunity to see the difference between the way
he experienced himself and how others perceived him, and to consider
the difference between the messages he intended to communicate in
the interview and the messages that were actually received.
We used other "games" to simulate various types of interaction in a
family system and thereby provide some experiential meaning to terms
like "marital discord," "breakdown in communication," "irreconcilable
differences," and to challenge students' common sense assumptions
about "happy" and "normal" marriages as well as their theories about
the "causes" of divorce. For example, a simple nonverbal game in which
two people sit facing each other and silently trace the movements of
each other's hands as if they were mirror images of each other can
dramatically demonstrate for each pair how "power" is exercised in a
relationship: who "leads" and who "follows;" how that decision is
made and enforced; how the "follower" can ultimately control the
relationship by allowing his mate to be the "leader." Other exercises
can be devised to demonstrate the set of mental mirror images that
determine the behavior of one person with respect to another: how
I see me; how I see you; how I see you seeing me; how I see you seeing
me seeing you.12 A failure of communication can take place on one or
more of these levels. For example, Peter wants children but Mary does
not (disagreement); or Peter and Mary both want children (agreement)
but Peter mistakenly believes that Mary does not (misunderstanding);
or Peter and Mary each know that the other wants children (under-
123. See R. LAING, H. PuILLPSON & A. LEr, INTERPEMsoNAL PERCEPTION 1.13-74 (1966).
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standing) but Peter incorrectly assumes that Mary thinks he does not
want children (failure to realize understanding).1 4
I have no way of measuring how much each student learned in the
class. Our meetings were exciting, playful, boring, threatening, awak-
ening, maddening disappointing, joyous. At times, our sessions were
more like improvisational theatre than class meetings. On other occa-
sions, they were more like tiresome bull sessions. Almost all of us,
though, came away from the experience feeling that something im-
portant had happened and, in some way, had changed each of us. In
the end, I suspect that the techniques and games were secondary. Some
of them proved to be very effective; others did not work very well for
us. What was most important was a certain openness and authenticity
that we came to share with each other and a willingness to risk the
exploration of new experiences-to risk losing our heads in the hope
of coming to our senses.12 5
Of Grades and Growth
Grades are the effluvia of the dying body of traditional education.
That is not to say that evaluation serves no useful purpose in an
academic institution. Without some kind of feedback, life, I suspect,
would be intolerable for students as it would be for any living creature
in any other environment. But the tendency to use grades as a disci-
plinary device or an incentive is useless, if not damaging, for it pro-
motes no real growth. Where the educational environment has become
a morgue, you cannot restore life by offering prizes for cadaver-of-the-
year.
Moreover, we have a substantial body of evidence that supports the
conclusion that "the relationship between course grades and occupa-
tional success is in fact very low, often approaching zero."'-"
I suspect that in one sense, we take grades too seriously, as if an
overhaul of our grading system would solve all our problems. Changing
grading systems, though, is like changing wives; our problems live
after them.
The purpose of eliminating grades, I take it, is to remove the fear
of not "doing well" so that students will have the courage to risk ex-
124. See id. 23-34.
125. See F. PFR.s, GESrALT THERAPY VERBATIm 50 (1969).
126. C. JENcEs & D. RIEs.LMN, THE AcADEM,,Ixc REVOLUTIoN 205 (1963). See also Raimi,
Examinations and Grades in College, AAUP BuI.I.mE'N, Autumn 1967, at 311.
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ploration of new areas in both the curricula landscape and in their own
interiors. Creativity is discouraged by humiliation, criticism and pun-
ishment for failure. The student is taught that he "has to be more,
better, in order to be somebody." 127 We never think of telling him
that he is good enough as he is. We can't because we don't even permit
ourselves to believe that we are good enough as we are. We keep on
rejecting what we are and then wonder why it is that we are living
in a condition of "alienation."
One of the most important conditions of creativity, as Carl Rogers
outlined them several years ago in a talk at a Conference on Creativity
at Ohio State University, 28 is that the locus of evaluation be internal:
"Have I created something satisfying to me? Does it express a part
of me-my feeling or my thought, my pain or my ecstacy?" These are
the only questions, Rogers insisted, that really matter to the creative
person. 12
That doesn't mean that we should start pampering and indulging
students or celebrating everything they do. But, there is a critical, if
subtle, distinction between saying to a man, "I don't like your ideas"
and "You are a C+ student." There is an important difference between
prodding a student to conform to some external standard of excellence
and encouraging him to develop his own unique capacity for growth.
Promoting creativity and growth then requires us to chart a course
somewhere between the Scylla of reward and punishment and the
Charybdis of protectiveness and indulgence. And somewhere along the
line we ought to free ourselves from the nation that we are somehow
responsible for whether or not students learn anything. That sense of
responsibility has been spawned by the Victorian assumption that
students are public charges delivered into our custody for the duration
of their academic lives, As long as we insist upon being responsible for
our students, they will never learn to be responsible for themselves.
Frederick Perls is the author of a bit of wisdom on this subject that
has come to be known as the Gestalt Prayer. I think it would be a
liberating way in which to commence our classes:
I do my thing, and you do your thing.
I am not in this world to live up to your expectations
And you are not in this world to live up to mine.
127. Dreikurs, The Developing Self in Human Potentialities, in HUMAN POTENTIAL.
nIEs: THE CHALLENGE AND THE PROMISE 80, 84 (H. Otto ed. 1968).
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You are you and I am I,
And if by chance we find each other, it's beautiful.
If not, it can't be helped.10
To return to the issue of grades, if we eliminate A's and B's and C's,
but substitute some other method of forcing conformity to external
standards (e.g., "Honors-Pass-Fail"), or if we perpetuate the professor
as Authority and Judge, we only delude ourselves. If we are committed
to retaining our present forms of education, then we cheat students by
depriving them of grades; where the only incentive to learn is the
grade, its removal will bring the entire engine of education to a com-
plete standstill. Perhaps that would be beneficial. It seems, though,
that those law schools which have experimented unsuccessfully with
some variations of a "Pass-Fail" system have neglected the possibility
that the failure may be in the educational organism itself and are now
contemplating a return to the regular grading system rather than a
re-examination of the entire structure of education. My own conviction
is that unless we are prepared to go the latter route, we ought to stop
entertaining ourselves with the illusion that we are doing something
about facilitating real learning by tinkering with the grading system.
One method of feedback that I have found valuable both for myself
(we sometimes forget about our own needs) and for students is the
Journal. Each student keeps a journal for the duration of the class and
is encouraged to make whatever entries he wants, no matter how wild
or irrelevant they might seem-fragments of ideas, speculations, feel-
ings about himself or other persons in the class, fantasies, far-out
theories, observations, resentments, reactions to a particular reading
or to a class. The journals are turned in periodically. I read them, enter
my own comments, share some of may feelings and impressions, and
then return them. At the end of the quarter, each student has a col-
lection of correspondence between the two of us and between him
and his self. Here is an entry from one journal:
I really really like the idea of this journal! I think it should be
encouraged in our culture . .. Girls can write in diaries but
American males can't; it is very anti-John Wayne to express feel-
ings-a strike against masculinity and all that. It is too bad because
reading over what I have written was a real experience. I recog-
nized myself.
The Journal is one way of beginning to open ourselves to our students
iSo. F. Pru.s, supra note 125, at 4.
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and themselves to us. Reading and writing in each of the journals was
enormously time consuming; at times, it was maddening and discourag-
ing to read what students had written, but it was also exciting and joy-
ful. It was a beginning of talking person-to-person, and of collaborating
in a joint and mutual evaluation, measured in terms of each individ-
ual's growth rather than his conformity to someone else's set of expec-
tations.
Three Entries, an Encounter, and a Poem
1.
It doesn't seem like this class has been meeting for 10 weeks.
But, when I look back over how I think this course has changed
me, perhaps that length of time has expired. The sessions have
given me great joy, as when I feel that I have finally said some-
thing that I understand and others do too .... I don't know how
to clearly state what has bothered me throughout the course, but
I have felt a threat of destruction of what I have been taught,
and what I had believed to be true. This has given me pause to
reconsider the effect of the law on individuals . . . and the im-
mediate application of some of our class experiences in my own
life... My gut feels good.
[Family Law Journal Entry of V.]2.
I suppose the word that most closely represents my feelings is
"disappointment." I was rather looking forward to this class for
several reasons. Needless to say, I'm so fucking bored with law
school, I can hardly see straight and I had hopes that this class
would be a refreshing change of pace .... I'm afraid that I really
didn't get any tremendous insight into "our group" and in fact,
found almost all of the observations to be bullshit.
[Family Law Journal entry by C for October 10, 1968]
I suppose I could start out by saying that I'm really tired of
writing in this book, but I guess that wouldn't be fair .... I could
tell you about all the wonderful things that have happened to
me... (Monday's class was fantastic and if you remember I par-
ticipated a great deal that night even to the point of cutting X
off when he started one of his long dissertations) . . . and all the
new things that have opened for me, but the fact of the matter
is that I'm not quite sure how this course has affected me. I have
given a lot of thought to what I saw and felt during the last ten
weeks and I think we only scratched the surface, but, at last, we
have begun....
[Family Law Journal entry by C for December 15, 1968]
3.
I'm in my brother-in-law's room, listening to his records. I often
seek this refuge when we visit my wife's folks. Especially when I'm
like this; so filled with strange churnings .... I went to the prison
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last night and it happened again: I soaked up much electric an-
guish; I felt the currents beneath the words and faces. Now I'm
here and expected to communicate in the old way-I can't. So I'll
play some records.
The convicts are responsive to Johnny Gash, but quiet, as the
Okie band grinds out another tune. Then the deep, nasal, twvang-
ing voice reaches:
... but Aahy shot a mahnn
in Reenoo, jest to watch him
daahyee ....
and the hall at Folsom Prison erupts. Screams, applause, whistles,
shouts of approval.
I remember the first time I heard the album I asked: "Shift
What kind of people are these convictsl" Now I know.
About the third time I went down to the prison I learned a
lot about fear and what it takes to overcome it. I'd rapped with
that convict before. We almost had something going, but he kept
trying to give me a pitch. So I reacted and the words kept going
while the communication stopped flowing. Now he's on the "hot
seat" [in an encounter session] and he's talking about his achieve-
ments. He says he's straightening out. Learning to talk to square-
johns, losing the convict habit. I jump up; I tell him I dig our
talks but that he makes me feel like I'm being hawked. Honestl
I'm honest! I told him for him. I want him to be honest for him.
The convicts are sullen, low boos are given. He reacts, gets hard.
Well, fuck 'em. If I can't be honest, I'll never get to know any-
thing, neither will they. Wait a minute... what's going on? The
talking's over, they're going to show a movie, the lights are out.
Son of a bitch I'm scared! I shouldn't have said what I did. I
should have let him think he was selling me .... No telling how
these guys will act in the dark if they hate you. They're not ra-
tional, not like us ....
Jesus ... what's got into me?
I get up. Work my way in the dark over to where he's sitting.
We rap. Get some coffee .... I have one cigarette left. He offers
me one of his non-filter prison butts. Our eyes meet... it's good.
"Tell you what," I say, "I'll trade you this Marlboro for one of
yours."
[Criminal Law Journal entry by J.]4.
"Marriage," "contract,"
"voidable," "void," "status," "fraud,"
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Because we'te here
... and have to?
find the word to
fill an empty space in time?
The room has slowly filled with smoke
and my eyes burn
and it is hard to "see"
Gently floating clouds
distort the words that I perceive
as I strive to focus
on
a group
That tries so hard
to focus
the minds of twenty-nine.
Or,
is that the scene at all?
Perhaps my eyes and mind
are searching for
a thing that isn't there ...
listening for some
different drum
that beats a silent plea
for something more,
While life goes on
and satisfies
the minds of twenty-eight.
[Family Law Journal entry by D.]
IV. Structure, Process and Space: The Politics of the Classtoorn
Mr. T-, how do you reconcile your teaching of democracy with
the way you conduct this class?
-An anonymous student.
Structure and Process
The classroom is not just a place where teachers and students meet
periodically. It is a complex social and political structure. In so far
as the learning experience of a student occurs in a class, his learning is
a function of a process of social interaction and is defined in part by
the power to determine the shape and content of the learning experi-
ences of group members and how that power is exercised. In his
interaction with the professor and other members of the class, the
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student will learn more about power, authority, justice, democratic
living, freedom, aggression and intimacy than be will absorb from all
the cases and books that he will read in his three years of law school.
The process of education, then, is more important than its content;
what you do in your classroom is more important than what you say.
In short, the educational medium is the real teaching message.
The dialogue in the classroom is often misleading. What appears
to be an argument about strict liability or contributory negligence may
really be a struggle for power and respect. A particularly incisive re-
buttal by the professor may be less important as instruction in torts
than it is about getting straight who makes the rules in the classroom
and what the penalties are for their infraction. Conversely, when a
student asks a series of irrelevant or irritating questions, he may not
be pursuing a new line of inquiry but implicitly asking, "Who's in
charge here?" or "How far can I go before the professor will put his
foot down?" Sometimes, a question directed toward eliciting the
teacher's point of view is contrived more to ascertain the limits of
permissible inquiry, Thus, a question such as, "Do you think the
police generally conform to the requirements of law?" may be ren-
dered more intelligible if understood as an effort to determine how
safe it is in this class to criticize the police. In an argument with a
student, a reference by a teacher to his prior experience as an attorney
may serve a useful function as a bridge between theory and practice,
but it also may be a method of confirming his authority in the class-
room and invalidating the perceptions of the student. The implicit
message may be: "Since you have never practiced, you are in no position
to have an opinion." A set of rules prescribed by the teacher for analyz-
ing certain types of cases may furnish the student with a useful model
for problem-solving, which he is free to accept or reject, but more often
it is intended and understood as another chapter in the Student's
Practical Guide to Making It in tho Law School World. In the jargon
of the law school underworld, "Either you give the Man what he
wants or he'll fail your ass. out of the course,"a13
Thus as a student becomes initiated into the social life of a class-
room group, he learns how power is distributed and exercised in the
class (constitutional law); when and where to respond to the teacher
and how to formulate his responses (civil procedure and evidence);
131. J. Farber, supra note 5, at 1. At least one guide to the grading system-N. Ster-
ling, Memo on Grades, October 1969 (unpublished document on file in Yale Law Library)
-has been prepared for law students.
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the mutual expectations of teacher and student (contracts); the sanc-
tions for violating the rules (criminal law); the limits of dissent (consti-
tutional law); how to secure affection and approval from the teacher
and the consequences of loss of love (family law); the boundaries of
permissible expression of self (property); and how disciplinary measures
can be perceived as ultimately benign, i.e., "for the student's own
good" (juvenile justice). 1 -32 The efforts of many law schools to protect
themselves from charges of discrimination in grading by assigning
numbers to students so that the grading process remains anonymous
provide a valuable lesson in justice. In their single-minded devotion to
the principle of "fairness," the schools move imperceptibly toward a de-
humanization of the educational process. "Justice," the student learns,
is the uniform application of a single set of standards or rules, and
he is gradually foreclosed from considering and experiencing the
possibilities of a concept of justice based on authenticity, feeling,
individual self-actualization and face-to-face encounter.183 He receives
neither a humane education nor education in humane lawmaking.
The student, in effect, is learning about rules that govern behavior
of people in groups which, after all, is what the law is about. When
he has forgotten the Rule Against Perpetuities, the Statute of
Frauds and the Doctrine of Collateral Estoppel, he will remember
the rules that were responsible for the management of his experience
as a law student, and while he may not be able to articulate them as
such, the odds are that he will apply them to the regulation of his
professional life with the same conviction and lack of awareness with
which his mentors impressed them upon him.
Most conventional classrooms are autocratic in their political struc-
ture. There are basically two kinds of autocracies: the "tough" autoc-
racy and the "benevolent" autocracy.131 The tough autocrat runs his
class with a maximum of discipline, order, control and criticism. The
professor is usually very conscious of his own position and authority
and any effort to challenge it is swiftly suppressed. He believes that
students cannot be trusted to learn without supervision and he is
careful not to spoil students by lavishing too much praise on them.
The benevolent autocrat, in contrast, is seldom harsh or severe; he
132. Power is always exercised by the faculty "for the best interest" of the students.
Cf. In re People of the State of California, for the Best Interest and Protection of Morris
Carley, An alleged narcotic drug addict, 81 Cal. Rptr. 414 (Ct. App. 1969).
133. See J. SHRLAR, LEGALIsm 57 (1964); G. COHN, EXISTENTIALISM AND LEGAL SGANCIr
122-23 (G. Kendal transl. 1967).
134. NATIONAL TRAINING LABORATORIES, HUMAN FORGES IN TEACHIING AND LVARNUW
Series, No. 2, LEADSmp IN ArxoN 53 (1961).
482
Vol. 79: 444, 1970
Toward a New Politics of Legal Education
provides as much praise as criticism; he seems as fair and is extremely
helpful. What makes his classroom autocratic is his use of benevolence
and praise as a method of manipulating students to conform to his
own expectations and to foster dependence on him for direction and
control of the class. In both types of autocracies, the role of the
teacher is that of expert and authority. 135 He defines and presents
the problems, indicates the correct method for solving them and
checks the student's work for proper application of the method. The
student has little or nothing to say about what he will read, how
much he will read, when he will read it, what will be discussed in
class today, how he will be evaluated, how many papers he will write
and what he will write about. In some cases, the teacher may even tell
him what size paper to use and where to set the margins on his
typewriter. 36 The amazing thing is that students stand for this. Con-
formity is exacted, I suppose, because a student's preceding sixteen
years of education have taught him to be compliant, dependent, re-
spectful and obedient. Most students really believe that the in loco
parentis rules and regulations to which they are subjected are ad-
ministered for their own benefit and that compliance is the road to
professional success.
We deliberately and systematically create an environment in which
autonomy is discouraged; where there is little opportunity for stu-
dents to make decisions that affect their lives; where risk-taking is
discouraged; where their only incentive to learn is reward and pun-
ishment; where they become exquisitely insensitive to each other
and eventually to themselves. We then wonder why it is that prac-
ticing lawyers complain about law graduates not having any "common
sense"--a congenial way of saying that our students lack judgment,
autonomy, perception, the ability to make decisions on their own,
to know how to deal with people, when and how to take the initiative,
when to assume responsibility and when to pass the buck. I say that
this is a "congenial" form of criticism because it assumes (falsely, I
believe) that "common sense" cannot be learned in the schools, that
it must await the experience of actual practice. It lets us return to our
classrooms, aware of the profound inadequacies of our educational
process, but content with the bland reassurance that we can't do any-
135. Even the "progressive" Model Code for Student Rights, Responsibilities and
Conduct, drafted by a committee of the American Bar Association, adheres to the concept
of the professor as "the ultimate authority in the classroom." Comments, § 5, reprinted in
STuDENT PRoTESr AND THE l~w 347 (G. Holmes ed. 1969).
136. See J. Farber, supra note 5, at 1.
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thing about it and grateful for the bouquet from the Bar Asociation
for the good job we're doing anyway.
What troubles me more than the absence of opportunities to learn
valuable professional skills is the presence of forces in our law schools
that tend to confirm or produce certain personality traits that are
basically inimical to democratic values. Submissiveness to authority,
dependence on external judgment, contempt for idiosyncracy, distrust
of feelings, excessive control of impulses, a predilection for formalism,
and an intolerance for ambiguity-these are some of the qualities that
are fostered by our traditional forms of legal education which are
also found in the authoritarian personality.13
Max Weber, while he was concerned primarily with German lawyer-
dom, found at the heart of the legal ethos an inevitable hostility not
only to all radical social reform but to democracy in general.108 De
Tocqueville, while he was more sanguine about the compatibility of
the legal tradition and democratic government, observed that American
lawyers "secretly oppose their aristocratic propensities to . . . [the]
democratic instincts [of the people] . ... u'1 And in a recent study
of the personality of German lawyers, Walter Weyrauch has said of
both American and German lawyers today that "contrary to common
beliefs and formal resolutions, [they] may have personality traits that
counteract or retard a wide distribution of democratic values among
all persons."'140
As the Supreme Court has noted, "a school is not like a hospital or
a jail enclosure,"' 141 but there are so many striking parallels between
educational institutions and what Erving Goffman has called "total
institutions," such as jails, penitentiaries and mental hospitals, that
their common characteristics ought to alert us to the dangers of
1M Cf. T. AnoRNo, E. FRENKEL-BRUNSWIcK, D. IEviNsON & N. SANFORD, Time Au.
THOkUtARIAN P~ftsoNMrry (1950).
138. See J. SHLAk, supra note 133, at 16, citing M. WEnR, LAw IN EcONOr.y AND
Soca=v (M. Rheinstein ed. & E. Shils & M. Rheinstein transl. 1954).
139. A. D TOQi)Evi , DEMOCRACY iN AM EmcA 175 (H. Commager ed. 1947).
140. W. WEYRAUaH, THE PERsoNAxrrY oi LAWYEv s 279 (1964). "They lean toward non-
equalitarian outlooks, at least on the unconscious level, preferring rower and authority
to persuasion." Id. Prbfessor Weyrauch cites an unpublished study of American law
students which tentatively concluded that third-year law students who were "politically
oriented" showed authoritarian personality characteristics. The study left open the pos.
sibility that these traits were acquired as a result of their legal education. C. Agger F4
M. Goldstein, Law Students and Politics: The Rising Elite, 1957, (unpublished paper,
on file in University of North Carolina Law Libtary).
141. Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School District, 393 U.S. 503, 1i.6
(1969), citing Hammond v. South Carolina State College, 272 F. supp. 947 (D.C.D.S.C.
1967).
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perpetuating schools in their present form. A colleague of mine'4-
has pointed out some of the similarities between Goffman's descrip-
tion of the procedures of total institutions and the first year of law
school. In the following excerpts from Asylums, I have substituted for
such words as "inmates" and "patients" the word "student" and for
the term "staff," the word "teacher":
Admission procedures and obedience tests may be elaborated
into a form of initiation that has been called "the welcome,"
where professors or students, or both, go out of their way to give
the new student a clear notion of his plight 44
* * 4
In total institutions there is a basic split between a large
managed group, conveniently called students, and a small super-
visory staff called faculty .... Each grouping tends to conceive
of the other in terms of narrow hostile stereotypes, teachers often
seeing students as bitter, secretive, and untrustworthy, while stu-
dents often see teachers as condescending, highhanded, and mean.
Teachers tend to feel superior and righteous; students tend, in
some ways at least, to feel inferior, weak, blameworthy, and
guilty. 44
The Student comes into the establishment with a conception of
himself made possible by certain stable social arrangements [and
modes of thought in schools previously attended]. Upon entrance,
he is immediately stripped of the support provided by these ar-
rangements. In the accurate language of some of our oldest total
institutions, he begins a series of abasements, degradations, hu-
miliations, and profanations of self. His self is systematically,
often unintentionally, mortified, He begins some radical shifts in
his moral career [italics in original], a career composed of the
progressive changes that occur in the beliefs that he has concern-
ing himself.. .145
Many [schools], like progressive mental hospitals, Merchant
ships, TB sanitaria, and brainwashing camps, offer the student
an opportunity to live up to a model of conduct that is at once
ideal and staff-sponsored-a model felt by its advocates to be in
the best interest of the very persons to whom it is applied.140
142. Dov Grunschiag, Assistant Professor of Law, University of California at Davis.
143. E. GoFmAN, AsTums, EsSAYS ON THE SOCIAL SrruATION, OF MI'rTAL pATWETS AND
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The alignments that have been mentioned represent coherent
courses to pursue, but few students seem to pursue any one of
them very far. In most schools most students take the tack of
what some of the students call "playing it cool." This involves
a somewhat opportunistic combination of secondary adjustments,
conversion, colonization and loyalty to the student group, so that
the student will have a maximum chance, in the particular cir-
cumstances, of eventually getting out physically and psycholog-
ically undamaged.147
The very methods we use in the classroom "undermine our chances
of surviving as a viable, democratic society." This is the unsettling
message of a recent attack upon American educational institutions
by two college professors in a book entitled, Teaching as a Subversive
Activity. 14s Teaching civil rights to law students who are still treated
as disenfranchised minority living in an academic Lowndes County1 4
or rhapsodizing about the value of freedom or privacy or due process
in a setting in which students are not free to read what they want
(at least not without running the risk of failing their courses) or say
what they really feel; where the only privacy they can find in the law
school building is in the men's room, and where there is no appeal
from the professor's final judgment of their academic performance,
is like celebrating life in a mortuary. Our words fall on dead ears.
We cling to the myth that we teach in ideologically neutral institu-
tions, but as Robert Wolff has pointed out, while this may be true
as far as the content of education is concerned, "the form of the
education defeats content, no matter how radical. Theory is divorced
from practice, students grub for grades in courses on revolution
[and poverty] as eagerly as in courses on [corporations, federal income
taxation and estate planning] .... Competition sets students against
one another even in courses devoted to the study of cooperation and
community."' 50
In a course that I am teaching this quarter on censorship and the
law, I found it worthwhile to spend the first few hours just getting
the class in touch with how we censor ourselves in group discussions
and to understand what the pay-off is in holding back on self expres-
147. Id. 64-5.
148. N. POSTmAN & C. WFANGARTNER, TEACiING AS A SUBVESIVE AcrvITrY 15 (1969).
149. J. Farber, supra note 5, at 1.
150. Wolff, The Ideal of the University, CHANGE IN HIGHER EDUCATION, September.
October 1969, at 48, 59.
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sion; that is, to make explicit the self-imposed rules that inhibit
freedom of expression in the classroom before proceeding to examine
the function and social value of censorship in our culture. It is my
conviction that without awareness of the processes that go in the
midst of our classrooms, talk about democratic values and social
policy is just so much crap.
It seems to me that the only kind of education that alone can
claim to teach lawyers to function in a democratic society is education
that itself is democratic and humane. In a democratic environment,
students would share with teachers the decision-making about courses,
assignments, scheduling, examinations, evaluation, and the content
and structure of class meetings. It would require teachers to be Au-
thorities less and people more-to give up control of the class, to cut
out some of the phoniness and start to be more real. This is not an
agenda for tomorrow or even the day after tomorrow, nor do I really
think of it as a program. My thoughts are too fragmented, disconnected
and illogical to fit into the contours of a proposal or recommendation.
All I can do at this point is to share some of the impressions and
feelings that have accumulated from my own experience.
From Forty-nine Fragments
1. Nobody ever really learns anything that he has no interest
in. Of course, a student can be forced to regurgitate certain things
on an examination, but as I have been reminded recently,151 since
examinations and toilets are the only places in our society where
puking is permitted, regurgitative mastery has limited social or intel-
lectual value. We ought to follow John Holt's suggestion 1 2 and find
out how much students forget after an examination and then take it
all and throw it out of the curriculum, for that is what students do
with it when the course is over; they throw it out after they throw it
up. Then, we ought to take a look at the little they retain-what they
make an integral part of their lives-and then try to understand what
miraculous process produced this microscopic learning.
3. Students need freedom, not just because freedom is a nice thing
to have, but because without space in which to breathe and grow,
organisms wither and die. The trouble is that, basically, we don't
trust students. We're afraid that if we give a student his head, he'll
lose his mind or go to sleep in the cornfields. We seem to have lost
151. F. PERLs, GMrALT THERA Y VE BATM 32 (1969).
152. J. HOLT, How Cr-RzN FAIL 175 (1964).
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sight of the fact that by maintaining a high degree of control and
encouraging dependence on authority, we debilitate judgment, auton-
omy, the ability to deal with conflict and other qualities that a man
or woman will need to cope with human problems in his or her pro-
fessional life.
4. As I was writing the last paragraph, I almost omitted the
women. We tend to forget about them in the law school, except to
use them as foils for dumb jokes. Their perceptions are discounted
unless they conform to our monolithic male vision, and there is no
space for them to grow as women as well as lawyers. 1r Our image
of them is perverse: they come to be viewed as male attorneys in drag.
In the course in "The Family and the Law" that I have previously
described,1M without the women there to shake the male students
loose from the myths with which most of them nourished their views
of sexuality, love and marriage, the course would have been a col-
lective delusion.
9. Educators like to talk about cultivating the intellect-a subject
which chills me just a little because, I suspect, of my aversion to
gardening in other people's minds. But, if we are really serious about
nourishing growth, we must have forests, not deserts. As for "discipline"
and "order," it is enough that the students do not run into the trees.16
14. Students are not easily deceived, at least not after the first
year of law school. By then, most of them are wise to our games, our
pretenses, our vulnerability; except, they usually play "dumb" and
don't let on that they know as much as they do, or else they deny
what their instincts tell them about their education and they continue
to play the game with implacable seriousness, so that the school be-
comes a place where students end up by rejecting their own intel-
ligence. I have come to feel that I cannot teach without being honest
about myself-my fears, my uncertainties, my boredom, my resentments.
But that is not an easy thing to do; it is frightening and painful.
Pain, though, seems to be one of those indispensable conditions of
learning, and courage I think cannot come without the acknowledg-
ment of fear.
15. Another word about honesty. If there are things we do not
want to do or subjects that bore us-if we do not want to explore
153. See Kass, A Woman's View of Law School, 15 STUDENT LAWYER J. 4 (1969).
154. See p. 468 supra.
155. See the dialogue in Marin, The Open Truth and Fiery Vehemenco of Youth,
CENTRM MAGAZINE, February 1969, at 68.
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certain lines of inquiry or examine certain problems or teach cer-
tain courses, we ought at least to be honest with students. Instead of
telling them that these things are "unimportant" or have little "value"
for lawyers or are not "appropriate" concerns of a law school, let us
admit that they hold no interest for us or that we don't want to teach
them or that they do not fit the contours of our own visions of what
the law is about. Then, at least, students will be free to make their
own judgments about the role of law and lawyers and decide for
themselves what is important to them.
23. Learning is nothing if it is not an adventure. And I find in
my own teaching that unless the journey is adventurous for me as
well-unless I am learning myself-nothing very much happens in
my classes. It is not enough for me to lead expeditions of students to
places I explored last year; it is important that our journies be joint
ad-ventures now.
29. Socratic "discussions" in which the professor attempts to get
students to arrive at positions plotted by him in advance are not
discussions. They are lectures or recitations masquerading as discus-
sions. Lectures, when they are informal, open-ended, invite questions
and comments, and are prepared to travel where students want to
explore, can be exciting discussions.
30. I have been informed on numerous occasions that the printing
press made the lecture obsolete, that anything that can be commu-
cated in a lecture can more efficiently be transmitted to students in
the form of printed copies of the text. McLuhan I think has demon-
strated the fallacy: "The auditory sense, unlike the cool and neutral
eye, is hyper-esthetic and delicate and all-inclusive."'10 Print-oriented
media, he explains, endow men "with the means of repressing their
feelings and emotions . . ."17 When lectures take for their text
the responses and questions of students-that is, when they generate
an electric current between teacher and student and student and
student-they serve to integrate the intellect and the senses.
31. To the extent that our educational forms are dominated by
the printed text-and this accounts for ninety-nine percent of the
present process of learning law-the law book publishing companies
are more instrumental in shaping educational policy than all the cur-
riculum committees and official bodies that pretend to have some
impact on learning in our schools. I once estimated that if law students
156. Af. McLumxA, UNDErSAXDING M ,IA 86 (1964).
157. Id.
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were to pool the money they spend on casebooks over a period of three
years into a single fund, we would have in a school of three hundred
students over half a million dollars with which to produce the educa-
tional materials we need. That would mean that we could have what
we need to teach rather than having to teach what we can get from
the publishing companies. Each year we suffer the same bland fare
from West, Foundation Press and Little, Brown & Co., spiced with a
few new cases and some stylish snippets from the latest law journals
and commission reports to maintain the illusion of relevance. Each law
school should have its own multi-media facility and staff equipped to
produce the learning instruments we need in our classes: case files, trial
transcripts, briefs, documents, photographs, maps, charts, videotapes
and films of trials, client interviews, negotiations, arbitration proceed-
ings, legislative hearings, soundtape and videotape recordings made by
students and teachers engaged in field work including interviews, police
radio motor patrol, community organization meetings, prison visits, in
addition to the judicial opinions, statutes and law review articles which
presently constitute the bulk of our resources.
34. I have heard teachers tell students that it is unrealistic for them
to expect most of their classes to be exciting because much of their
professional lives will be spent in doing things they do not like; and,
since school ought to be a preparation for life, they might as well start
getting used to that now. In trying to respond to that potent bit of
logic, I never know where to begin: it sounds so convincing. It seems
to me, first of all, that education is no more a preparation for life than
today is a preparation for tomorrow. Of course, some people live for
tomorrow, but I don't regard that as living. Secondly, in so far as school
is a preparation for life, dull schools become places where people learn
to live dull lives. You have only to watch a young child at play to
understand that dullness is not instinctive; it takes years of learning
and training to acquire it. And once acquired, the habit of dullness
is rarely unlearned. Finally, the admonition to empty my life today so
that I can prepare for the bleakness of tomorrow is neither a philosophy
of life nor of education; it is the counsel of despair.
37. If we view the classroom as an ecological system, rather than an
arena for individual performances, some things begin to make more
sense. Consider grades for example. In a class in which there is a high
degree of dependence of student on teacher and teacher on student
for mutual confirmation, the need of the teacher to feel superior may
be maintained at the cost of the students (or some number of the stu-
dents) feeling worthless. Where students fail to conform to expecta.
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tions of the teacher, he may seek to maintain his position of authority
by giving nonconforming students low grades. The individual student
experiences pressure of the most powerful, though subtle, kind to con-
form to the rules that govern the social system in a particular class,
and he may find that the only way he can effectively resist the pressure
is to withdraw from the field of forces operative in the system. How-
ever, unless the student drops out of the class, the rules prohibit with-
drawal and his defensive strategy is interpreted as academic failure.
Whether a low or failing grade is actually a healthy response to a dys-
functional learning system, then, seems to me to be always an open
question. Similarly, boredom in the classroom may be a political act,
rather than a condition inherent in the individual student. That is,
boredom may be a reaction to power, when the consequences of sub-
mission to authority are perceived as being too damaging to the in-
dividual. In attempting to understand the dynamics of the educational
process, we might start paying more attention to entire systems of
learning rather than isolated performances.
49. Whatever happens in my classes, I try to make the rules explicit
and get students to become more aware of the group process itself. No
school that I know of offers a course in "The Politics of the Classroom,"
but it is probably the single most important learning experience in the
career of a student. To the extent that our law schools are engaged in
the education of persons who will eventually play a significant role in
making laws for other people, it is important that they understand
first the laws that are made for them and the rules they impose upon
themselves. We may not be able to dispense with laws, but at least we
should be able to recognize them where they operate and decide how
effective they are in encouraging the development of human potential
and facilitating personal growth. Until lawmakers start understanding
the nature of the rules they make for themselves that stifle their own
growth and impoverish their lives, they will never stop making laws
that confine and deform the lives of other people.10
Man in Space: The Architecture of Education
Architecture, Frank Lloyd Wright once wrote, is form in space ap-
propriate to man.1 59 It is an arrangement of physical space that pro-
ceeds from the structure of our interior lives (inner space) and the dy-
namics of our relationships to other lives (social space). Buildings, then,
158. I am indebted to Ruth Savoy for this perception about law and lawyers.
159. F. WRiGHT, AN AlrmucAN AlcHrracrupx 19 (E. Kauf-nann ed. 1955).
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are not merely containers for our bodies, but integral parts of our
psychological and social lives. 1°
The pressing task is to create new environments for new kinds of
learning experiences. We are concerned here not merely with beau-
tification campaigns for our schools, but with generating a condition of
education that is indispensable to learning itself. In reassessing the
limits of inner and outer space, we might begin with the ecology of
the classroom. Educational microspace-the distance between students
and students and teachers and students-and their spatial organization
in the classroom has remained essentially unaltered since the Renais-
sance. Students sit in (generally uncomfortable) chairs, neatly aligned
in long rows (and frequently riveted to the floor), facing the teacher
(never each other, on the theory, I suppose, that students never know
anything worth hearing anyway). Visually, the classroom, as McLuhan
has pointed out, is the exact counterpart of the linear structure of the
printed page, "with the teacher like the page heading, and the lines
underneath... the movable type being the students." 101
The Teacher
stands at the head of the classroom, physically separated and isolated
from students, like the heading on a printed page, although McLuhan's
analogy is not quite precise since students in the classroom, unlike type,
are not movable; interchangeable, perhaps, but not movable. The struc-
ture of the classroom determines its process: teacher centered, linear
(one dimensional), static and detached. We can begin to crack the old
educational molds by restructuring the visual, auditory and tactile
environments, by opening up the space within the school and making
it more flexible, enabling it to grow as educational methods develop.
We know from recent studies on the emotional and expressive values
of direct visual contact, for example, that there is a significant relation-
ship between classroom seating arrangement and active participation
of students in the learning process. 162 Rearranging straight rows of
chairs around a table increases group interaction; a circular table is
more effective than a rectangular table and a circular seating arrange-
ment without a table is most effective in facilitating participation. The
circular design also dislodges the teacher from his unique spatial loca-
160. See McLuHAN, supra note 156, at 123-130.
161. McLuhan, i wonder whether the rebellion of children ... ., in McLUtAN, Hor F:
COOL 145 (Steam td. 1967).
162. See Sommer, Classroom Ecology, 3 J. O1' AwPPm BrAviohAL, ' ctNc1c 489 (1967).
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tion in the classroom and closes the distance between teacher and stu-
dent, between teaching and learning.
In large classes of say forty or more students, small group teaching-
learning can be effectively combined with more conventional large
group presentations by providing open and flexible classroom area that
can be easily subdivided by partitions and by furnishing them with
light, movable and "compressible" chairs and desks. This would enable
a class during a single two hour meeting (for example) to move easily
in and out of small and large group experiences. The same result could
be accomplished, although with less intimacy for small groups, by
simply altering the acoustical properties of a large unpartitioned area.
In traditional schools, the large classroom is planned to facilitate voice
projection over large distances, a design which makes it impossible for
small groups to carry on simultaneous discussions, By using carpeting,
porous ceiling materials and "wells" in the floors, however, the noise
in the room can be maintained at a level that will permit this kind of
teaching process.163 For large group activities, voice projection can be
facilitated electronically by means of small, portable voice amplification
units. By integrating these flexible open spaces with audio-visual sys-
tems and closed-circuit television networks, moot courtrooms and inter-
viewing offices furnished with one-way mirrors and adjacent viewing
rooms, the law school can begin to simulate the experiences and en-
vironments in which students will be immersed in their professional
lives. Their education can be a living experience now.
Several elementary and secondary schools have been recently com-
pleted using the divisible open space concept, but not enough to
standardize problems and render solutions commonplace.10' It has
been described by one architectural journal as "an experimental but
continuingly successful [architectural approach] countered by a com-
plexity of newly engendered teacher-student relationships, . .. [the suc-
cess of which will depend on] teacher response and student condition-
ing to this radical change in the traditional school space."1 65
In one of his occasional Sunday morning talks to the architecture
students of the Taliesen Fellowship, Frank Lloyd Wright began with
a tray full of seashells and inviting his students to "look carefully at
these hundreds of beautiful, infinitely various little houses," le urged
163. See Site and Program Generate a New School Shape, A1cHnEzmrUTnn REconD, May
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them to seek in the design of their own structures that same "expression
of inner life by appropriate form" manifest in the dwellings of these
sea creatures. 166 To judge from the buildings that house most of our
law schools, they were designed with a monumental indifference to
the inner needs of the human beings who come to live within its walls.
The newer ones usually look like corrugated boxes, prisons or concrete
appliances, rarely like human forms; but the saddest part is that nobody
really seems to care much; the feeling is that almost anything with
classrooms, faculty offices, a library and a toilet will do. In the con-
struction of most school buildings, there is usually more politics than
inspiration, more concern for efficiency than comfort or beauty. If
education, though, is to be what Jacques Maritain called "a human
awakening," we must have human environments in which to live, not
the maladaptive structures that pass for places of learning in most
educational institutions today. That means that components such as
furniture, rugs, paintings, fireplaces, lighting, windows, and gardens
need to be seen not as "amenities" or "accessories" but as integral parts
of socio-educational space. It is not enough to provide students with
telephone booths in the library (sometimes referred to as "carrels")
and furnish some space in the basement next to the boiler room with
tables and chairs and a sandwich dispensing machine and expect that
somehow their academic lives will be enhanced.
Where it is necessary to have large spaces where many people can
meet, it is wasteful to build lavish auditoriums; "We want places where
there is just a beautiful blank floor and beautiful blank walls," Buck-
minster Fuller has suggested, "upon which to cast our pictures or apply
crayons.' ' 1 " His geodesic domes are ideally suited to this purpose and
they also can provide us with movable, transformable environments
that will become increasingly important as our educational institutions
become actively involved with the problems of urban centers and rural
areas.
We are just beginning to realize that our environments aren't just
shelters from the wind and rain but new languages with the power to
radically alter our consciousness and sensibility:
Get ready the greatest new educational facility. .. assuming that
any dreamable vision of technical advance will be a reality and
man is about to demonstrate competence beyond our estimates of
yesterday and today.1 8
166. Wright Faith in Your Own Individually, 98 HousE BAuTIFUL 270, 302.
167. R. B. FUTTER, EDuCATIoN AUroMATIoN 86 (1962).
168. Id. 87.
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V. The Whole Man: The Interdisciplinary Study of Law
It is apparent by now that if the law is to concern itself with human
problems, our schools cannot endure in self-contained enclosures. As
Muzafer Sherif noted at the recent Symposium on Problems of Inter-
disciplinary Relationships, "man does not arrange his problems or
divide them up neatly along lines laid down by academic disciplines."' ,,
There is, he observed, an "irreversible trend" toward interdisciplinary
programs in the graduate and professional schools.'70 In the law schools
in particular, the question is no longer whether we will have them,
but when, how, and how much?
Part of the problem with many of the interdisciplinary ventures
that are already under way in the law schools is that their fruits have
been largely irrelevant to the concerns of the law, or, if relevant, seem
to add little understanding to what most law professors believed they
already knew anyway. 7' There is, of course, an edge of arrogance that
most lawyers will never quite get over, but our ethnocentrism is by
no means unique 72 and in some instances the resistance to collabora-
tion is based on a healthy skepticism. Consider, for example, the joint
ventures of psychiatrists and law professors that have been undertaken
at several law schools in the past decade. In almost every instance, the
psychoanalytical model has been dominant. With its emphasis upon
individual and intraphysic phenomena, psychoanalytical theory is un-
congenial to law, which is primarily concerned with the behavior of
men in social settings-with their interaction in groups and their trans-
actions with members of other groups. That is not to say that the psy-
choanalytical model is dispensable, but only that in the absence of an
integrated theory of interactional and transactional processes, psycho-
analysis alone has little relevance to the statement and resolution of
legal problems. In focusing then on the deficiencies of Freudian psycho-
dynamics, it is important not to throw the baby out with the bath water.
We need to continue to press our interdisciplinary efforts, but unless
our pilgrimage into the promised land of science is spirited by a quest
for new theoretical constructs and a common language that will place
169. Sherif, Interdisciplinary Coordination as a Validity Check: Retrospect and Pros-
pects, in INmDIScIPmARY RELATIONSHIPS IN THE SocIAL ScxzNc Es 7 Of. Shexif & C. Sherif
eds. 1969).
170. Id. 4.
171. See Kalven, The Quest for the Middle Range: Empirical Inquiry and Legal
Policy, in LAw IN A CHANGiNG AMRIcA 59-62 (G. Hazard ed 1968).
172. CAwrBELL, Ethnocentrism of Disciplines and the Fish-Scale Model of Omniscience,
in INTERDIsCIPINARy RErATIONSHIPS IN THE SocAL. ScmNcEs 828 (M. Sherif & C. Sherif
eds. 1969).
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the individual and his internal processes in the context of "social
collectivities of experience," 1 3 our journey is likely to prove disap-
pointing.
Much of the enthusiasm for interdisciplinary collaboration has cele-
brated the value of the methodological instruction and empirical data
with which the sciences can inform legal theory. This pneumatic opti-
mism is inflated by at least two assumptions, both of which seem to me
false. The first, as Harry Kalven has pointed out,17 4 is that once the
empirical facts are established, the determination of the legal issues
will automatically follow. That is a myth which lawmakers tend to
perpetuate because it gracefully avoids confrontation with the under-
lying moral and political issues. In times of crisis, the appointment of
a President's Commission or the appropriation of large sums of money
to fund empirical research are usually dramatic ways of rising to meet
the challenge of contemporary social problems without doing anything
about them. Changes in the laws relating to the death penalty, the
treatment of criminal offenders, the police, juvenile behavior, social
welfare administration, drug use and obscenity will not proceed from
the accumulation of scientific data because the attitudes of most people
toward these problems are not shaped by anything organized or co-
herent enough to be susceptible to management by the scientific imagi-
nation. Those attitudes are more often the expression of hostility
between warring subcultures' 75 or the articulation of socially shared fan.
tasies and hallucinations which the treatment of psychotic patients has
demonstrated do not readily yield to the methods of logic or science.
The retention and vigorous enforcement of the marijuana laws, for
example, are not based on any serious belief that marijuana is more
harmful than tobacco or alcohol, but reflects what McLuhan refers to
as "the cultural aggression and revenge of a dying culture against its
successor."' 76 The effectuation of change, then, requires fewer exercises
in scientific demonstration and greater skill in the management of
interclass hostility and the treatment of collective delusion; it calls for
less facility in the quantification of "facts" and more of an effort to put
people in touch with the ultimate datum of human experience-the
feelings which generate the values each of us hold and which ulti-
mately lubricate the engine of social change.
The second assumption that I alluded to earlier is that lawyers have
173. R. LAMNG, THE PoLrTcs oF ExPIJNc 49 (1967).
174. See Kalven, supra note 171, at 66-67.
175. See J. GusFmLE, SYmzouc CRuSADE 4-12, 16-24, 11-38 (1963).
176. McLuhan, Interview, PLAYBOY, March 1969, at 53, 66.
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all the theoretical structures they need (or at least are capable of for-
mulating the right questions) and only require the janitorial services
of other disciplines to collect and profess the facts with which to con-
firm the visions they have already fashioned or to tidy up the com-
partments into which the law has forced the stuff of human experience.
The intellectual arrogance of lawyers tends to blind them to the new
perspectives with which other disciplines can illuminate legal problems
that have become encrusted with lawyers' "commonsense" notions of
social reality. In the area of criminal law administration, for example,
one agenda that lawyers have prepared for interdisciplinary study
proceeds on the assumption that we will somehow learn more about the
"causes" of crime if we examine the personality, character, chromo-
somal structure and social class of individual offenders. 77 The question
as it is put by the lawyer-why is it that certain individuals act in
bizarre and violent ways, and how can we control this behavior?-
defines crime at the outset in such a way as to make it unlikely that
we will arrive at any dearer understanding of this phenomenon, what-
ever methods of the sciences we choose to apply. A number of psy-
chiatrists, psychologists and sociologists are suggesting that it might
make more sense to view the phenomenon of crime as a process of
social interaction in which the legal process itself plays a critical role
rather than seeing it as an objectively given form of individual con-
duct. This kind of perspective would require us to dismantle the
entire conceptual apparatus of actus raets and metes rea and to begin to
understand crime not as the behavior of an individual offender but as
a complex set of offender-victim-police-court iteractions and transac-
tions' 7 8 We know, for example, that most homicides do not occur in the
street, but in the home, and not between strangers, but between people
who are close to each other. This suggests that homicide may be a symp-
tom of dysfunctional patterns of interaction within a family, and that
the subject of investigation and treatment ought to be the potentially
homicidal family rather than a class of dangerous individual offend-
ers.'79 Similarly, an act of "juvenile delinquency," from an interactional
perspective, may be viewed as a situation in which the juvenile is being
"scape-goated" and is expressing an upset or disequilibrium within the
177. Cf. Gigeroff, Phenomenology and the Law, 7 CRIMINOLOGICA 9 (1969).
178. See J. Mohr, Towards Phenomenological Models of Criminal Tranactions: Actus
Rues Reconsidered (mimeo 1965), cited in Macnaughton.Smith, The Second Code Toward
(or Away From) a Theory of Crime and Delinquency, 7 CuMtL'uoLocias 15, 21 (1969).
179. Cf. Cheek, Family Socialization Techniques and Deviant Behavior, 5 FUL y
PRocMss 199 (1966).
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entire family as a social unit.18 0 The delinquent act "can be looked
upon as the only 'safe' way of calling attention to an intolerable family
situation."''1 or it may ultimately be an effort to preserve self by leav-
ing the family. Any effort by the child to identify more explicitly the
real conflict in the family would be perceived as "disloyal" by other
members of the family. Virginia Satir, one of the pioneers in tile field
of family therapy, has pointed out how a child in a dysfunctional family
can become burdened with the responsibility of "living for his parents."
When he tries to get validation of himself as an individual and to satisfy
his own needs, his behavior is likely to be perceived as rebellious or
delinquent. s2 When the legal process is invoked as a method of deal-
ing with this disturbance in the homeostatic mechanism of the family,
the child is officially labeled as "delinquent," thereby confirming and
perpetuating the family pattern of interaction and the resultant be-
havior of the child. In the administration of the legal process itself,
the interaction between attorney-parents-probation officer-judge gener-
ates a network of "parental" coalitions against the juvenile defendant
that has the effect of undermining his bargaining power and legal
rights. Thus, recent efforts to afford greater protection to the juvenile
by guaranteeing representation by counsel in delinquency proceedings,
however high-sounding the rhetoric, become practically meaningless.183
My point is that the accumulation of empirical data will just add
more debris to the dead weight the law schools are already carrying in
their train unless traffic with other disciplines occurs before further
research is undertaken. Moreover, effective interdisciplinary integra-
tion is ultimately dependent upon the development of a unifying set
of ecological models emphasizing the interactional processes of human
behavior. If, to take another example, we view schizophrenia as a form
of dis-ease of an entire social subsystem-the family-rather than as in-
dividual pathology calling for a change in the behavior of an individual
or his removal from society,18 4 what happens to the meaning and func-
tion within the legal system of such labels as "insanity" and "mental
illness"? What implications would an interactional analysis of mental
180. D. LANGSLEY & D. KAPLAN, THE TREATMENT OF FAMILIES IN Cmsls 10 (1968),
181. Framo, Rationale and Techniques of Intensive Family Therapy, In INTENSiVIr
FAMILY THERAPY 143, 155 (I. Boszormenyi-Nagy & J. Framo eds. 1965).
182. V. SATIR, CONJOINT FAMILY THERAPY 60-61 (1968).
183. See Platt & Friedman, The Limits of Advocacy: Occupational Hazards in
Juvenile Court, 116 U. PA. REV. 1156, 1176-84 (1968).
184. See Bateson, Jackson, Haley 86 Weakland, Toward a Theory of Schlzophrenla, 1
BEHAVIORAL ScIENcE 251 (1956); Wynne, Ryckoff & Hirsch, Pseudomutuality in Family
Relationships of Schizophrenics, 21 PsycanARY 205 (1958); R. LAING & A. Es'ntsoN,
SANITY, MADNESS AND THE FAMILY (1964).
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illness have for a legal order that authorizes the institutionalization
of one member of a dysfunctional family on the petition of another?18
And what new problems are raised for "rehabilitation" models of con-
trol over individual conduct if we discover that certain forms of psy-
chotic behavior actually involve a positive process of disintegration that
constitutes the first step toward personal growth 80 and that efforts to
reintegrate the "identified patient" back into the family, without treat-
ing the entire family as a family may be disastrous because the family
has a vested interest in keeping the patient "sick"? The current pre-
dilection of many lawmakers for systems of civil commitment and pre-
ventive detention as procedures for dealing with "dangerous" and
"sick" persons pose grave risks to civil liberties not only because of
the absence of safeguards normally associated with the criminal process,
but because of the tendency to impute "dangerousness" or "illness" to
an individual when the threat comes not from fear of physical violence,
but from the "organizational threat" he presents to existing social
arrangements and values and the consequent "need to justify collective
action against him."Us7 We have become so accustomed to focussing on
individual delusional behavior that we have become insensitive to the
dangers that attend the formation of the collective fantasies and hallu-
cinations that dominate our perceptions of the unholy trinity of crime,
madness and evil.188
How, then, shall we proceed in formulating an agenda for the inter-
disciplinary study of law? Whatever we eventually decide to do, we
should not allow ourselves to be deluded into believing that interdis-
ciplinary competence can be achieved by providing law students with
temporary visas to visit the outlying provinces of the psychology, sod-
ology or political science departments or even by sponsoring more
formal "joint-degree" programs in which law students would combine
courses in another department with some of the more traditional offer-
ings in the law school. Aside from the problems generated by depart-
mental prerequisites, the highly arbitrary organization of content into
separate departments in the University itself defeats the very purpose
of interdisciplinary study. The insularity and intense "nationalism" of
185. See, e.g., N.Y. MENrAL HYGmNE LAw § 124(2) (McKinney Supp. 1969). See gen-
erally F. LINDMAN 9- D. MCINnTx, THE MEITALLY DISABLED M TIM LAw 23, 49.55
(1961).
186. See K. DARowsmx, PESO.sALn- SHPING TnRoUHc PosMVe DismrnAno.; 77
(1967).
187. Lemert, Paranoia and the Dynamics of Exclusion, 25 Socxoimmmy 2, (1962).
188. See M. FoucAuLT, MADNESS AND CIMIZATION 205 (1965).
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each department, as Donald Campbell has recently explained,11 tends
to foster an acute hostility to other disciplines and to discourage any
crossing of disciplinary lines. Moreover, many of the courses offered in
other departments present a pretty bland fare at the undergraduate
level, and even many of the graduate courses are not immediately rel-
evant to the concerns of lawyers. In psychology departments, for ex-
ample, Andrew Watson has noted,00 there is often a large order of
experimental psychology which has little value to lawyers who are more
immediately and clinically concerned with problems of human be-
havior.
"Interdisciplinary integration," in Campbell's words, "has to take
place within single minds."'' 1 It is not enough to marry psychology
and law and then leave it to the Lord to make them live together In
some vital and relevant way. Unless conceptual material and empirical
hardware from other disciplines are carefully tooled and fitted to spe-
cific issues or areas in the law, an interdisciplinary program will tend
to become a hodge-podge of unrelated concepts. Even team-teaching
will not solve our problems unless there is an overlap of concerns and
knowledge, a common language and a personal rapport between the
individuals involved. One route we might travel, suggested by Francis
Allen, is to develop institutional arrangements designed to encourage
and advance self-education by members of our own faculties in dis-
ciplinary areas outside the formal boundaries of the law.102 The dif-
ficulty here, as in joint-degree programs for students, is that unless
law professors are freed from the constraint of pursuing traditional ac-
ademic routes as a condition of securing legitimacy for their inter-
disciplinary competence within the academic community, such a
program is not likely to succeed.
There are a host of other objections that can be, and have been
raised, to undertaking interdisciplinary ventures in the law schools.
A GAME OF CHESS: The law has been seduced by the sciences be-
fore, only to be awakened in later years to the folly of its innocent
189. Campbell, supra note 172, at 336.
190. Watson, The Law and Behavioral Science Project at the University of Penn-
sylvania: A Psychiatrist on the Law Faculty, 11 J. OF LECAL EDUcAToN 73, 74 (1958).
191. Campbell. supra note 172, at 340. This is the substance of comment , made by
Robert Dubin, Research Professor of Sociology at the University of Oregon, and several
others at a symposium on problems of interdisciplinary relationships held In 1967. Se
Dubin, Contiguous Problem Analysis: An Approach to Systematic Theories about Social
Organization, in INTmRiscpLiNARY RELATIONSHIPS IN THE SOCIAL SCIENCES 65 (M. SherIf &
C. Sherif eds. 1969).
192. Allen, One Aspect of the Problem of Relevance in Legal Education, 54 U. VA. L,
REv. 595, 600 (1968).
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optimism. 19 3 CHECK. No law school has been successful to date in
developing a viable model of interdisciplinary study. CHECK. It is
difficult to find people who are prepared to devote the time and re-
sources to developing interdisciplinary competence. CHECK. There
are inadequate financial resources available to support empirical re-
search or to free faculty members for a sufficient period of time to
develop the kind of integration we need. CHECKMATE.
The cabinet of gloom, perhaps, contains some good medicine for
that insuperable innocence (to which I have succumbed at times) which
speaks glibly-almost magically-of interdisciplinary programs, as if
one could be invoked by a mere vote of the faculty. Some of the resis-
tance to interdisciplinary collaboration, I suspect, has been generated
by a certain reluctance of the gatekeepers to permit strangers to enter
that stately and orderly mansion of legal education in which we have
all been living so comfortably. But the trouble is that many of our
house guests are dying of boredom, especially on the second and third
floors, and their boredom may have something to do with serious defects
in the structure. Abraham Goldstein is right when he says that for
many of our students who have heard "the promise of interdisciplin-
ary adventure and social action so much in the air these days, it
comes as a cruel disappointment to find law school very much like col-
lege-except that its organization is more random and archaic."'"" As
social problems proliferate, traditional legal education, aggressively
abstract and perversely indifferent to the findings of the social and
behavioral sciences concerning the human condition, is in serious dan-
ger of becoming a monumental irrelevancy in the process of social
change.
VI. Traditional Legal Education: The Future of an Illusion
An illusion is not the same as an error, it is indeed not necessarily
an error .... It is characteristic of the illusion that it is derived
from men's wishes; in this it approaches the psychiatric delusion,
but it is to be distinguished from this, quite apart from the more
complicated structure of the latter.... [W]e call a belief an illusion
when wish-fulfilment is a prominent factor in its motivation, while
disregarding its relations to reality, just as the illusion itself is.
-Sigmund Freud13
193, See Kalven, supra note 171, at 58-63.
194. A. Goldstein, The Unfulfilled Promise of Legal Education, in LAw L' A CIIANGm.C
AEmEacA 151, 162 (G. Hazard ed. 1968).
195. S. FREUD, THE FUTURE OF AN ILLUSION 54-55 (%V. Robson-Scott transl. 1928).
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Most members of the law teaching profession today, I am sure, will
agree that there is a need for some improvement in the quality of legal
education, but the overwhelming majority is committed to the belief
that our educational process is basically sound. The "Socratic dialogue";
the casebook method (at least in the first year); the content of the first-
year curriculum; the emphasis upon intellectual rigor and ruth-
less analysis of argument; the conviction that an emotional approach
to the law is inappropriate; the desirability of retaining "objec-
tive" measures of relative performance; the importance of learning to
"think like a lawyer"; the assumption that students do not know what
is "best" for them but that teachers do-these are some of the canons
of the theology of orthodox legal education, dissent from which is
regarded as heresy.
Each year, the entering class at every law school is subjected to the
ritual of the orientation lecture in which the law novitiates receive
the credo from the high priests of legal education. They are told that
the Law, like the Lord, is rigorous, exacting and uncompromising in
the demands it will make on their lives for the next three years. And
while those who are married may find the course somewhat less pain-
ful, the implicit admonition to that forgotten legion of women, the
law wives, is that unless they learn to accept the law as a "jealous
mistress," they would do well to get a divorce. For the students, the
message is that the life that lies before them is difficult and set with
hazards from which only the blessings of the faculty can protect them,
and that the benevolence of the faculty is perishable and must, like
our daily bread, be earned anew each day.106
The problem with the sacrament of self-sacrifice is that it requires
the sacrifice of yourself, the thing which curiously "the world is least
apt to inquire about and ... of all things the most dangerous for a
man to let people notice that he has . . ."197 Last night, I talked to a
friend who was a law student when I started teaching and I wondered
whether we would see any real innovation in legal education in the
next twenty-five years. Adapting a passage from Kierkegaard, he said
that law school teaches students to deal with every conceivable loss,
that of an arm, a leg, five dollars, a wife-every one, that is, but the
most important, the loss of one's self, which "may pass off as quietly
as if it were nothing ....
196. This is a paraphrase of an observation by J. HoLT, How CIIILDRlEN FAIL 180(1964).
197. S. KIERK=AAR,, THE SICKNESS uNTo DaxAm 165 (W. Lowrie transl. 191).
198. Id.
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Toward a New Politics of Legal Education
Today, the desire to make radical change, whether it be political or
social or educational change, is regarded as one of those peculiarities
of the "young"-a symptom which, like rock and sexuality and hair,
will pass when the "young" grow older. I am sick of seeing teachers
attempt to soothe dissident students into a stupor with patronizing
talk about the idealism of youth. Some of them are sincerely touched
by the idealism of their progeny; but in truth, as one astute observer
has remarked, "the 'young' are economic, social and sexual threats, and
[their parents and teachers] ... really do hate them, as much because
they are so resolutely moral as anything else."'10
The principal difference between the New Politics and the Old
Politics is that the spirit of the former is committed to tying political
change to a revolution in personal life; that is, "politics ... is the way
somebody lives his life."200 The failure to understand "the indispens-
ability of a radical personal culture or life-style," Susan Sontag suggests,
is perhaps what made the Old Left
so vulnerable to piecemeal co-option by the liberal establish-
ment .... Bending the mind and shaking loose the body makes
someone a less willing functionary of the bureaucratic machine.
Rock, grass, better orgasms, freaky clothes, grooving on nature--
really grooving on anything-unfits, maladapts a person for the
American way of life.20'
The real "unliberated zones" are the interiors of our own personal lives.
There will undoubtedly be movement in legal education. Even a
sloth moves if prodded long enough. But to what purpose will we inte-
grate existing psychology courses (for example) into the law curriculum,
or develop joint degree programs, when one of the country's most
eminent psychologists has recently said of academic psychology that
it is probably "leading every field in dogmatism, rigidity, narrow
orthodoxy, and scorn of social involvement"?202 And how long can we
continue to pretend that the traditional methods and concepts of the
law are adaptable to the needs of the poor when those who have had
any experience with legal services programs acknowledge that the
contributions of the conventional strategies of civil and criminal justice
199. Anonymous, quoted in Jerome, The American Academy 1970, CQruGcE Titn
EDuT AIoN Sept.-Oct. 1969, at 10, 37.
200. A. HoFmrAN, RM'OLUTION FoR TaE HE oF Ir 59 (1968).
201. S. Sontag, Some Thoughts on the Right Way (for us) to Love the Cuban Revolu.
tion, RAmPARTS, April 1969, at 6.
202. Rogers, The Increasing Involvement of the Psychologist in Social Problems:
Some Comments, Positive &. Negative, 5 JouRNAL oF APPLim BEHtAviorAL Scm 3 (1969).
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to social justice is "diffuse, microcosmic and dull"?203 One might as
well say that our schools are preparing students to write novels by
teaching them the alphabet.
I am disturbed by the present drift of legal education, not in the
way that loud noises and sudden jolts are disturbing, but as countless
nights of dreamless sleep are disturbing. Unless we begin to perceive
the law school as a community of human beings living in the here-and.
now, we may find that our educational theology is an illusion and that
the promised professional after-life is but another form of death. The
question, then, is not whether we are moving, but whether in moving
we are growing, or if, like some great tortoise that begins its last jour-
ney to the sea, we are moving only because we are dying.
203. Hazard, Social justice Through Civil Justice, 36 U. CHI. L. REV. 699, 712 (1969).
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